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Smart Grid is a system that accommodates different energy sources, including solar, 
wind, tidal, electric vehicles, and also facilitates communication between users and 
suppliers. This study tries to picture the interaction among all new sources of energy 
and market, besides managing supplies and demands in the system while meeting 
network’s limitations.  First, an appropriate energy system mechanism is proposed to 
motivate use of green and renewable energies while addressing current system’s 
deficiencies. Then concepts and techniques from game theory, network optimization, 
and market design are borrowed to model the system as a Stackelberg game. Existence 
of an equilibrium solution to the problem is proved mathematically, and an algorithm 
is developed to solve the proposed nonlinear bi-level optimization model in real time. 
Then the model is converted to a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints 
using lower level’s optimality conditions. Results from different solution techniques 
including MIP, SOS, and nonlinear MPEC solvers are compared with the proposed 
  
algorithm. Examples illustrate the appropriateness and usefulness of the both proposed 
system mechanism and heuristic algorithm in modeling the market and solving the 
corresponding large scale bi-level model. To the best knowledge of the writer there is 
no efficient algorithm in solving large scale bi-level models and any solution approach 
in the literature is problem specific. This research could be implemented in the future 
Smart Grid meters to help users communicate with the system and enables the system 
to accommodate different sources of energy. It prevents waste of energy by optimizing 
users’ schedule of trades in the grid. Also recommendations to energy policy makers 
are made based on results in this research. This research contributes to science by 
combining knowledge of market structure and demand management to design an 
optimal trade schedule for all agents in the energy network including users and 
suppliers. Current studies in this area mostly focus either in market design or in demand 
management side. However, by combining these two areas of knowledge in this study, 
not only will the whole system be more efficient, but it also will be more likely to make 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Motivation and Background  
Carbon Dioxide is one of the major reasons of global warming. Using electricity 
generated from fossil fuels means CO2 is being released into the atmosphere. Fossil 
fuels not only are not environmentally friendly, but also have increasing prices due to 
their limited availability. A comprehensive interviews supplemented by academic 
literature (Sovacool, 2009), summarized the four most important mechanisms in 
promoting renewable energy and energy efficiency as: eliminating subsidies, altering 
electricity prices, forcing utilities to adopt renewable energies (FIT policies), and 
increasing the public information and supporting the low income families. In recent 
decade demand for green power has increased significantly. Currently about one third 
of US electricity customers have the option to purchase green power directly from 
marketer or utility company (Bird, Wüstenhagen et al., 2002). Contribution to 
environment and slowing global warming is not only about using more 
environmentally friendly sources of energy, but is also about energy consumption 
management. Schweitzer and Tonn (Schweitzer and Tonn, 2005) surveyed several 
energy efficiency projects and concluded that the least effective measures were related 
to carpools, interest reduction programs, procurement, and home energy rating systems. 
While the biggest opportunities were in improvements of  thermal integrity of building 
shells and envelopes, electric equipment, and lighting, along with better energy fuels, 
and employment of energy management controls for shifting demands. Demand 
Response (DR) programs help consumers and environment through scheduling and 
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assigning their consumptions to optimal time periods of day with more available supply 
capacities.  
Different studies have discussed and examined importance and value of DR programs 
(Bushnell, Hobbs et al., 2009, Cappers, Goldman et al., 2010, Chao, 2010, Gottwalt, 
Ketter et al., 2011, Kowli, Negrete-Pincetic et al., 2010). Electricity DR programs 
mainly follow two approaches. One is minimizing consumption and the other is shifting 
demands from peak hours to non-peak hours. However, shifting demands without 
considering real time pricing, which is dependent on market, cannot make a significant 
contribution to managing demands. Research has shown the benefits of dynamic 
pricing in DR programs (Bushnell, Hobbs et al., 2009, Chao, 2010). A study on realistic 
generated load profiles in Germany showed peak demand is shifted from a peak time 
to another time if day ahead flat and hourly price is used in DR instead of Real Time 
Pricing (RTP). The study also depicted that DR with indirect participation of 
households through retailers has less incentive for users  (Gottwalt, Ketter et al., 2011). 
Consequently it is important to have an integrated demand scheduling and real time 
pricing model for demand response management in the power grid. Although several 
approaches and techniques are introduced for defining RTP (Samadi, Mohsenian-Rad 
et al., 2010), there is a major issue in implementing RTP in DR programs due to 
communication and exchange of information between consumers and the market. 
Studies relate low penetration of the RTP in DR programs to poor marketing and 
limitations in technical assistance to help participants manage price volatility (Albadi 
and El-Saadany, 2008). Although enrolled customers in DR programs in USA helped 
with about 38,000 MW peak load reduction in 2008, an empirical study implied only a 
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small share (less than 10%) of total potential peak reduction is in real time rate DR 
programs and concluded installing more interval meters for residential units and small 
commercials to inform the customers of the real time rates would overcome the issue 
(Cappers, Goldman et al., 2010).  
Pricing rules are mainly defined according to the economy and structure of market. 
Energy market is usually designed in two steps: forward and spot market (Baldick, 
Helman et al., 2005). Forward market is a beforehand (usually day ahead) market in 
which long term contracts are set, while spot market is real time in which contingencies 
and uncertainties are carried out. Studies suggest that forward market reduces the risks, 
mitigates market power, reduces incentives for manipulating prices, and coordinates 
new investments (Ausubel and Cramton, 2010, Kamat and Oren, 2004). However, it is 
important that spot market sends reliable price signals to forward market (Kamat and 
Oren, 2004). Roles and market power in electricity market affect pricing rules. O’Neill 
(2009), divides market process into three stages. The first stage is market rules which 
are decided by voting with commission approval. The second stage is Independent 
System Operator (ISO) who allocates rights and costs of transmission and 
interconnection services. Finally, the third stage is about auction market including 
sellers and buyers in which same rights are assumed for expressing marginal cost and 
value for both sides. Monopoly market with one seller has the minimum social welfare 
while oligopoly market with few sellers and perfectly competitive market with several 
sellers result in higher social welfare because of their competitive environment 
(Nanduri and Das, 2009). Defined functions and hierarchy among different stages and 
level of competition in the system determine electricity market structure (Ralph and 
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Smeers, 2006). The structure defines whether pricing model would be based on demand 
or supply function, locational marginal prices (LMP), bidding offers, or other 
definitions. 
The DOE & ORNL (Laboratory, 2008) concluded through their surveys that the most 
effective energy efficiency policies are combinations of policies addressing multiple 
issues. Having only feed-in-tariff (FIT), which is long term contracts or payments to 
renewable energy producers, without removing subsidies and implementing real time 
pricing interferes with the idea of users conserving energy or selling it back to the 
system. Moreover, removing subsidies on conventional energy sources only and not 
implementing more realistic prices in the system wouldn’t help changing usage 
behaviors. That is because countries are not motivated enough to not use cheaper 
sources of international resources compared to domestic resources. They found giving 
information to people is important. Usually decisions on type of energy appliances are 
made by ones who are not paying the bills and have contradictory objectives to ones 
who pay the bills (like landlords). People just look at lump sum values of the bills and 
have no idea about details of their consumptions. That means implementing realistic 
prices should be followed by giving information to consumers. When Norway 
increased prices suddenly by 43% due to shortage of capacity in 2003, consumers only 
decreased their demands by 2.3% (Aune, 2007).  
“subsidies for electricity related fuels have existed at least since 1880s, alternative rate 
designs since the 1950s, feed in tariff, system benefits charges, and the rest since the 
1970s and 1980s” (Sovacool, 2009). Investing in FIT but not implementing more 
realistic prices does not motivate consumers to invest on new technologies. To 
 
 5 
implement new pricing rules, people need to receive information. Moreover, as long as 
consumers do not trust the source of information they do not change their behavior. 
And so persuasion is very difficult. “So what seems to be lacking is not the availability 
of robust public policy mechanisms, but the political and social will to implement them” 
(Sovacool, 2009). So all these factors are connected to each other like a cycle and lack 
of any of them would break the cycle. 
Challenges discussed here could be resolved by implementing a system with two-way 
communication among participants in the power grid and market. Two-way 
communication facilitates information exchange and motivates interaction among all 
participants in the grid which may lead to shaving peak demands and managing storage 
capacities more efficiently. Participants in two-way communication could be individual 
costumers or retailers who help customers take most advantage of their money and 
resources. The main goal in this system would be improving the cost value of energy 
consumption and accommodation of environmentally friendly energy resources while 
providing financial benefit. This system is called Smart Grid. A Smart Grid would 
employ real-time, two-way communication technologies to allow users to connect 
directly with power suppliers and energy market. The U.S. National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) defines “The term “Smart Grid” refers to a 
modernization of the electricity delivery system so it monitors, protects and 
automatically optimizes the operation of its interconnected elements – from the central 
and distributed generator through the high-voltage transmission network and the 
distribution system, to industrial users and building automation systems, to energy 
storage installations and to end-use consumers and their thermostats, electric vehicles, 
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appliances and other household devices. The Smart Grid will be characterized by a 
two-way flow of electricity and information to create an automated, widely distributed 
energy delivery network. It incorporates into the grid the benefits of distributed 
computing and communications to deliver real-time information and enable the near-
instantaneous balance of supply and demand at the device level.” (Von Dollen, 2009). 
The U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) also measures DR 
programs and consumer energy efficiency as the highest priorities in the overview of 
the Smart grid: “Market information is currently not available to the customer domain. 
Without this information, customers cannot participate in the wholesale or retail 
markets. In order to include customers in the electricity marketplace, they need to 
understand when opportunities present themselves to bid into the marketplace and how 
much electricity is needed.”1 Implementing DR programs in Smart Grid could be 
effective in improving capacity margins and providing attractive alternatives to 
generation resources’ additions and transmission upgrades (Kowli, Negrete-Pincetic et 
al., 2010). The German industry group, BDI, has claimed demand side management 
technologies as the mainstream by 2015 in the roadmap of the transition from current 
energy infrastructure to Smart Grid (Block, Bomarius et al., 2008). They highlighted 
the development of “applications and services implementing the coordination of the 
energy grid on the economic level” as one of the main challenges in this way. This 
dissertation is focused on development of such an application. A novel energy system 
mechanism along with its mathematical model and solution algorithm for an integrated 
                                                 
1 Report to NIST on the Smart Grid Interoperability Standards Roadmap, Page 95, Section 6.2.1 
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dynamic demand response scheme in spot market for Smart Grid is developed. 
Optimization and game theory frameworks are employed as a basis to support the 
formulations and analysis.  
Problem Statement 
This research develops an advanced model integrating an appropriate market structure 
with corresponding demand management system for Smart Grid. As the future of 
energy and electricity market in the world and USA (Energy, 2009), Smart Grid 
includes several decision makers at different levels whose strategies affect the system. 
A hybrid market is chosen in this study to model this system which has a decentralized 
and more sophisticated design, but a more favorable structure after failure of California 
design (Baldick, Helman et al., 2005). Spot market clearing procedure is designed as a 
model of hierarchal optimization between ISO and Big Generating Firms (BGFs). 
Based on a survey from eleven market modeling experts on priorities for future market 
model developments, system operator should be seen as a strategic agent (Neuhoff, 
Barquin et al., 2005).  
To design an appropriate system for the future Grid, consideration of specific 
characteristics of Smart Grid is inevitable. First of all, there would be smart homes with 
smart appliances and meters in Smart Grid. Although some appliances in a house such 
as refrigerators, have strict time of use some others, such as dishwashers and dryers, 
have flexible time of use. Distribution of energy consumption among different 
appliances and devices in a household is demonstrated in Table 1. As it conveys, 78% 
of energy usage belongs to 12 main categories of appliances which mostly have 
demands with flexible time of use.  
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Table 1 Household appliances energy consumption2 
Appliance % of household energy consumption kWh/year/household 
Refrigerator 13.7 1,462 
Air conditioning 16.0 1,446 
Heating 10.1 3,524 
Water heating 9.1 2,552 
Lightening 8.8 940 
Cloth dryer 5.8 1,079 
Freezer 3.5 1,150 
TV 2.9 313 
Oven 2.9 314 
Dishwasher 2.5 512 
Computer 1.5 318 
Washer 0.9 120 
Residual 22.3 47,838 
 
Using real time pricing information provided by smart meters to users, flexible 
demands could be shifted from peak periods to non-peak periods. Moreover, 
establishing Smart Grid will increase popularity of plug-in electric vehicles on the 
roads. Electrical vehicles should be able to be plugged into the network in different 
locations and time instances for charging or discharging electricity which affects 
electricity network stability drastically. Finally, subscribers to Smart Grid could have 
independent roles as consumer, supplier, storage owner or a combination of two or 
                                                 
2 U.S. Energy Information Administration (July 2012) 
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three of these roles. That means they need to know whether they should consume, sell 
or store electricity at each time step. These unique characteristics introduce new 
decision making problems into energy systems. Subscribers to the system need to know 
not only when, but also where to buy/sell their extra energy for/from their appliances 
and vehicles from/to the grid in a way to meet their demands while being cost efficient. 
Some households, large schools, hospitals, companies or restaurants which have large 
solar panels on their roofs, or small wind turbines in their field might generate much 
more electricity than what they normally consume. This would be an option for them 
to sell the extra energy to the grid at the market price or they could store it for their 
future demands in their large scale batteries. Two-way communication in Smart Grid 
enables subscribers or their retailers to participate in the energy trade through smart 
meters which could be programmed beforehand or controlled by the retailer. 
Participants in the trade face a two dimensional decision making problem:  location and 
schedule of their demands, supply, and storage based on their individual preferences 
and real time prices. Given the notice, dependency among these decision making 
problems due to elasticity of price to total supply and demand in the grid, a game 
approach should be incorporated in the model. So in the proposed model each 
participant looks for his best strategy in a non-cooperative game as his schedule of 
demand and supply to maximize his payoff based on his utility function and real time 
market price. 
There are three main categories of decision makers in this problem (Figure 1): 
Independent System Operator (ISO), Big Generating Firms (BGF), and all Subscribers 
to the Demand Response program (SDR) in the system. Each decision maker has its 
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own objective, constraints, limitations, and solves its own problem. However, each 
decision affects others’ decisions. 
 
Figure 1 Decision makers in the system and their flow of influence 
ISO operates the transmission and distribution network and clears market as an 
independent decision maker. ISO decides on amounts of allowable trades among all the 
participants in the market based on the specifications of the system and limitations of 
the network. This decision making problem will be referred to as ISO’s decision 
problem in this study.  
Big Generating Firms, BGF, are the firms owning large generating facilities or the ones 
capable of providing large amounts of supply to the system such as large heat engines, 
large wind turbines, etc. BGF’s decisions can highly impact the system through 
availability of their generating capacity which determines market price. Their objective 
is to maximize their individual revenue while adhering to their capacity and network 
limitations. Since the number of BGFs is usually more than one, they compete against 
each other in an oligopoly market. 
The last category includes majority of decision makers who subscribe to the Demand 
Response program in the system and participate in the trades directly through 
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programming their smart meters or having a retailer to act on their behalf through 
controlling their smart meters and appliances. These players are referred to as SDR in 
this study. Their objective is to maximize their individual benefit, which here is defined 
as their individual welfare, while scheduling their demand and supply dynamically 
according to network limitations. 
Modeling Smart Grid in its real size is almost impossible considering all the 
computational difficulties. In Chapter 3, an approach is proposed to deal with the large 
size and complexity of this system while solving the problem in real world size.  
Research Context and Scope 
The broad context for this research is design of an integrated market mechanism and 
demand management model in Smart Grid at a zonal level. In this research interaction 
among participants in the network under the influence of the market specifications and 
network characteristics is studied. 
Current demand management studies are mostly appropriate for the old power grid 
(Albadi and El-Saadany, 2008). Few available studies that are related to Smart Grid 
(Chen, Kishore et al., 2011, Kiani Bejestani and Annaswamy, 2010, Mohsenian-Rad, 
Wong et al., 2010) do not consider and cover main characteristics of Smart Grid 
including location based decision making, two-way trades for each subscriber at each 
time step, incorporation of distributed storage capacities in the network, and most 
importantly including a market structure considering all these characteristics.  
In this study a novel integrated dynamic market mechanism is used to propose a 
demand response model for location-based scheduling of demand, supply and storage 
of subscribers in the Smart Grid based on real time pricing and players’ preference 
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function in a game theoretic approach while the market is being managed by the system 
operator at a zonal level.  
Computational tractability of optimization models and long term modeling capability 
of equilibrium models make their combination an appropriate approach to this problem. 
Few works attempted to solve multi player non cooperative games and  they mostly 
used iterative methods (Nanduri and Das, 2009). In this study we attempt to solve large 
scale multi player non cooperative game through optimization techniques. The game 
among participants is modeled as an optimization problem for each individual to 
maximize its benefit, while the market structure is modeled as a one-leader multi-
follower Stackelberg game through bi-level programming. Existence and validation of 
the approach is then proved through mathematical techniques. A decomposition based 
algorithm is used to develop a real time algorithm solution for the model in large scale. 
Mathematical proofs and solutions from the corresponding Mathematical Program with 
Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC), mixed integer, and SOS integer models are used to 
evaluate the proposed solution algorithm. Finally, the proposed model is evaluated on 
several case studies and sensitivity analysis is conducted on the parameters to show 
their effects on the decisions of the participants in the system. 
The proposed model makes Smart Grid run easier and promotes a certain level of 
disaggregation in such a large system. The results of this research could be 
implemented in the future Smart Grid meters to help users and market operators 
communicate together and enable accommodation of different resources of energy in 
the network. It would help preventing waste of energy by optimizing users’ schedule 
of trades in the grid. Moreover, recommendations to energy policy maker can be made 
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upon some of the results. This research is mostly focused on the operation side of the 
demand response program in the future smart grid system.  Therefore, the market 
design is not detailed in all its aspects. 
Research Objectives 
This research has the following main objectives: 
 Propose a dynamic demand response model for location-based scheduling of demand, 
supply and storage of all subscribers in the Smart Grid which considers real time 
pricing and a preference function of the users in a game theoretic approach at a zonal 
level. 
 Propose an integrated dynamic market equilibrium and demand response model for 
Smart Grid to manage and control the zonal energy market in the system. 
 Develop a solution approach for the identified problems using mathematical 
techniques  
Contributions 
There are many future suggestions based on current game theory studies in both 
demand side management and micro grid distribution networks in Smart Grid which 
are summarized in (Saad, Han et al., 2012). This dissertation which is a combination 
of both micro-grid distribution and demand side management covers most of 
recommendations on future extensions to the state of the art mentioned in the current 
literature.  
This dissertation will make the following contributions to the energy market and 
demand management state of the art: 
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 Designing a dynamic game for Demand Response program in the Smart Grid which 
contributes to the state-of-the-art through: 
o Location-based decision making 
o Two-way trades for each subscriber at each time step 
o Incorporating distributed storage capacities in the network 
o Joint scheduling and storage optimization 
o Considering multiple energy sources beside multiple consumers 
o Enabling customers to optimize tradeoff between waiting time and billing 
charges for using appliances 
o Considering strategic energy source whose objective is not aligned with that 
of the consumers 
o Applicability of the model for Smart Grid by considering its specific 
characteristics 
 Designing an appropriate market mechanism to address current system’s deficiencies 
 Integrating market design and demand response program in a way to be applicable to 
Smart Grid at the zonal level 
 Developing games with players with different and opposing strategies 
 Developing solution algorithm for solving the proposed large scale Bi-level problem  
 Conducting sensitivity analysis on exogenous parameters 
Dissertation Outline 
Following the introduction in Chapter 1 which presented the motivations, problem 
statement, scope, objectives and research contributions, Chapter 2 reviews the related 
research in the literature. Chapter 3 is dedicated to defining market mechanism and 
problem formulation.  It presents assumptions, definitions, and the mathematical model 
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for the problem. Chapter 4 introduces the solution methodology and validates the 
approach. It also describes the different evaluation methods to be used in this study. 
Chapter 5 documents different case studies and numerical results. And finally, Chapter 





Chapter 2: Literature Review and Background 
This dissertation is based upon combining two areas of research, energy market 
equilibrium and demand response modeling, which was rarely done previously. In this 
section these two areas of knowledge are reviewed and finally the only work related to 
combination of the two areas is discussed. 
Market Equilibrium 
Recently there has been a fair amount of literature devoted to finding market 
equilibrium. Market structure and regulations define the modeling approach for finding 
market equilibrium. Approaches mostly fit into one of these categories: 
Cournot/Bertrand models, Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE), Conjecture Supply 
Function (CSF), Stackelberg, and Auction based models. 
In Cournot/Bertrand models, agents compete on quantity/price strategies for the Nash 
equilibrium which is the best response of an agent to its opponents’ strategy. Jing-Yuan 
and Smeers (1999) modeled an oligopolistic Cournot game for regulated transmission 
prices and generating firms and used Variational Inequality technique for solving it. 
Yao and Oren (2004) modeled a Stackelberg game for two settlement markets with 
forward market in the upper level and Cournot generating firms and Cournot ISO in 
the lower level while ISO decides on import/export quantities at nodes. They 
implemented two computational approaches: one based on penalty interior point 
algorithm (PIPA) and the other based on steepest descent approach. Yao and Willems 
(2005) capped forward prices and spot prices separately and concluded there is less 
incentive for generators to commit to forward contracts due to spot price caps, but there 
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are more incentives due to forward price caps. They showed spot zonal prices decrease 
under both cap settlements compared to single settlement cases. Since this problem 
could be decomposed to generators, they concluded there is no importance of 
generators’ ownership in the model. However, when transmission constraints were 
nonbinding, equilibrium gave uniform nodal prices that were systematically higher 
than Cournot equilibrium price corresponding to a single market with the aggregated 
system demand function. So they concluded that import/export variables for ISO as 
strategic variables are not satisfactory. To overcome the problem, Yao and Adler 
(2008)  modeled a stochastic Stackelberg game for two settlement markets with 
forward market in the upper level. They assumed Cournot generating firms and 
Bertrand ISO in the lower level. Strategic variables for ISO were locational price 
premiums. They then solved the Equilibrium Problems with Equilibrium Constraints 
(EPEC) using their iterative approach on Belgian electricity network. 
In SFE models firms compete over their offer curve strategies for the Nash equilibrium. 
Hobbs and Metzler (2000) proposed an oligopolistic game among supplier firms which 
was modeled as a MPEC. Leading firm in the upper level decided on the intercept of 
the bidding supply function and in the lower level ISO solved the quadratic problem 
for the single commodity Spatial Price Equilibrium (SPE) and linearized DC Optimal 
Power Flow (OPF) problem for all other firms to find their generation and demand 
quantity and transmission allowances. They used penalty interior point algorithm for 




In CSF models, generating firms conjecture regarding their rival firm’s sales’ 
adjustment in response to price changes. CSF first used in power market in a work from 
Day and Hobbs (2002). This type of modeling is more flexible in large size 
transmission networks due to their smooth function; however, they have more 
behavioral parameters to calculate which should be estimated through empirical studies 
or sensitivity analysis. They claim CSF is a more realistic model for imperfection 
competitions for 3 main reasons: 1) CSF includes Cournot conjecture models as a 
special case. 2) Cournot models cannot be used when price elasticity in demand is zero. 
3) Unlike supply function equilibrium models, CSF equilibriums can be used for large 
scale models.   
In Stackelberg games one or more agents are leaders and other firms and agents will be 
followers. Decision on the hierarchy of decision makers in the model depends on 
assumptions and market organization defined in the problem (Ralph and Smeers, 2006). 
These problems are mostly modeled as EPEC models and leader decision problem is 
in the upper level while followers are in the lower level. Gabriel and Leuthold (2010) 
modeled an energy market with network constraints as a Stackelberg problem with a 
leading firm in the upper level and ISO as follower. The equilibrium constraints of the 
MPECs were converted to integer constraints and solved for a fifteen node network of 
the Western European grid. Pozo and Contreras (2011) formulated strategic bidding 
problem in pool based electricity market for joint price and quantity bids in multi agent, 
multi period and multi block games. They proposed finding multiple Nash equilibriums 
through an iterative procedure by adding a constraint emitting the hole containing 
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previous solution. They linearized EPEC using strong duality for the lower level and 
used Fortuny-Amat representation and a binary expansion for the bilinear expression.  
In auction based models, a bidding mechanism and market clearing procedure are 
designed. Gross and Finlay (1999) proposed a sealed bid auction model for determining 
the optimal bidding strategies of a bidder in a competitive electricity generation market. 
The only aspect they considered was generation strategy for generators. 
Attaviriyanupap and Kita (2005) proposed a bidding strategy for a day-ahead market. 
Bidding parameters for markets are determined through a non-convex optimization 
which they solved through evolutionary approach. They considered both single and 
double auctions. Double auction models for market mechanism in electricity and heat 
network has also been introduced in different studies (Block, Neumann et al., 2008, 
Block, Collins et al., 2009, Carsten, John et al., 2010). Zou (2009) designed a double 
auction mechanism to control the market power by transferring payments among 
participants based on their contributions to social welfare. Vytelingum and Ramchurn 
(2010) developed a market mechanism based on continuous double auction which 
manages congestion through pricing the electricity flow. They decided on quantities in 
an optimization approach and prices through a double auction. Wen and David (2001) 
assumed suppliers/large consumers bid a linear supply/demand function and 
maximized social welfare. They tried to find the optimal coefficients in the functions 
through stochastic optimization modeling using Monte Carlo approach. In another 
study, Lamparter and Becher (2010) proposed an agent-based double auction bidding 
mechanism for Smart Grid to maximize social welfare. Duan and Deconinck (2010) 
introduced a multi-agent model for the market in smart Grid considering all different 
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agents in 3 phases: activation, negotiation and conclusion. They examined different 
types of auctions in the simulation such as Frist Price Sealed Bid (FPSB), Vickery, 
English, and Dutch.  
There are also studies on energy market based on optimization models for one firm, 
and simulation based models (Marks, 2006, Ventosa, Baıllo et al., 2005) which do not 
necessarily look for an equilibrium in the market. 
The studies on energy market equilibrium and their main characteristics are 
summarized in Table 2. 
Demand Response Program 
Users or system operators can support the grid by adjusting loads in time. Demand 
response refers to costumers’ consumption adaptation to market either through shifting 
demands or reducing demands. Different demand response programs have been 
designed and implemented in energy and specifically electricity networks (Rahimi and 
Ipakchi, 2010).  
Demand response programs can be divided into two main categories (Albadi and El-
Saadany, 2008, Bollen, 2011): incentive based and price based programs. In incentive 
based programs customers receive either credit or money for reducing their 
consumption or shifting it. However in price based programs customers match their 
consumptions based on the prices in the system. Incentives can be either in form of 
curtailment programs or market based programs which can reward participants with 
bill credits, money rewards, or discounted rates. However, price based demand 
response programs are based on non-flat rates in the system during day which can be 
in different forms such as:  
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 Time of use pricing: In this format there are higher prices during predefined expected 
peak periods.  
 Critical peak pricing: In this format higher prices are in place during up to 15 extreme 
days of the year and flat rate is in place other times. 
 Multi-tier prices: In this option prices are per kWh consumption over a certain 
consumption level or per carbon dioxide emission for a certain amounts of 
consumption. 
 Real time pricing: In this system prices are fluctuating based on the real value of 
electricity in the market. 
Benefits of non-flat pricing in DR programs are well known (Bushnell, Hobbs et al., 
2009, Chao, 2010). Albadi and El-Saadany (2008) defined DR program benefits in four 
main categories: benefits to participants, market wide benefits, reliability and market 
performance. They divided DR costs for both participants and program owners to initial 
and running costs such as establishing technologies and inconvenience costs. Gottwalt 
and Ketter (2011) simulated a demand response program with realistically generated 
load profiles in Germany and used both day ahead flat and hourly prices. However, 
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they concluded that peak demand is being shifted from a peak time to another time 
when real time pricing is not in effect.  
DR programs schedule and assign consumptions in different time steps. Approaches 
toward modeling DR programs are optimization based, game based, agent based, and 
algorithm based modeling.  
Optimization based models are mostly LP with one objective function. They model 
demand response for a user/users with a single resource of supply which could be a 
retailer or a utility company. Pedrasa and Spooner (2009, 2010) modeled appliances’ 
scheduling through an optimization model with a fitness function for the users. They 
used Particle Swarm and Binary Particle Swarm Optimization method as a heuristic 
population based search technique for solving the model.   
Mohsenian-Rad and Leon-Garcia (2010) proposed an LP optimization model for 
scheduling appliances with a tradeoff between minimizing waiting time cost and 
minimizing payments. They discussed different scenarios and adopted them into their 
model such as storage capacities in Plug in Hybrid Electric Vehicles (PHEV), and 
interruptible and uninterruptable residential loads. They depicted peak to average load 
ratio decreases drastically and claimed that as an incentive for utilities to deploy the 
model in large scale. They also showed that a combination of their designed scheduling 
and real time pricing would result in consumers’ payments reduction.  
Conejo and Morales (2010) proposed a LP robust optimization model for real-time 
demand response in Smart grid. They assumed price information is being 
communicated to the users hourly. Their model is dynamic on rolling horizon basis and 
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uncertainty in price is considered. LP solver is used for solving the model. They showed 
users benefit from an increased utility by incorporating the proposed model. 
Erol-Kantarci and Mouftah (2011) modeled a simple linear scheduling model for 
demand response and used heuristics for solving it. 
Lujano-Rojas and Monteiro (2012) used predictions of electricity prices, energy 
demand, renewable power production and power purchase of the costumers to 
determine the optimal utilization of different appliances and electrical vehicles through 
negotiations between retailer and costumer. They showed that the number of 
combinations increases exponentially and so used genetic algorithm for solving the 
problem. They claimed their proposed model would reduce electricity bill 8-22% for a 
typical summer day for users. 
Contrary to optimization models which only consider one objective, game-based 
models consider objectives of all players in the game. Game-based studies in DR 
programs mostly assume competition is among users of a single source of supply.  
Mohsenian-Rad and Wong (2010) modeled demand response to minimize cost of 
generation in the system and users’ payments minimization while distributing loads on 
time horizon to minimize peak to average load ratio (PAR). They showed that 
minimizing cost results in PAR reduction if the cost function is strictly convex and 
increasing. Their price function was proportional to total daily energy consumption of 
each user. However, in their proposed model network constraints, storage capacities, 
and location based decisions are not included.  
Chen and Li (2010) using supply function equilibrium as pricing model, designed two 
demand response models for matching and shaping demands. They showed in a 
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competitive market where customers are price takers, system achieves an efficient 
equilibrium that maximizes the social welfare, while in an oligopolistic market where 
customers are price anticipating and strategic, the system achieves a unique Nash 
equilibrium that maximizes another additive global objective function.  
Wang and Kennedy (2010) designed a bidding mechanism among retailers and 
suppliers for demand response. Generators and retailers submit bids for the time 
horizon considering price elasticity matrix which is the change in electricity 
consumption at a scheduled hour due to a change in electricity price of that same hour 
or any other hour. Their bidding mechanism is carried out by an iterative market 
clearing algorithm. 
Li and Chen (2011) proposed a demand response model in which users try to maximize 
their own benefit which leads to the retailer’s benefit. They used an interesting 
approach for modeling different devices including electrical vehicles. They defined the 
real time price function and showed that everyone would benefit from the real time 
price.  
Zhu and Basar (2011) found the Nash equilibrium for a stochastic model of demand 
response and scheduling of demands among large population. They introduced a multi-
resolution stochastic differential game framework to capture macroscopic and 
microscopic interactions among a large population of players.  
Chen and Kishore (2011) introduced a Stackelberg game among Energy Management 
Controller (EMC) in each home as follower and service provider as the leader based on 
a RTP model. Their RTP model is based on a retail price consisting of wholesale price 
(function of production) and the price gap which they designed to figure out the 
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influence of the difference between the actual demand and available supply. They 
showed the model is beneficial for both reduction in consumption and consumers’ 
payments.  
Bu and Yu (2011) proposed a 4 stage Stackelberg model for decision making on 
amounts retailers should buy from the electricity pool, the price they should offer to 
the costumers, and finally the amounts costumers should buy. Retailers have the option 
of choosing supplies from cheap and uncertain supply or expensive and certain supply 
in the first two stages. They used a backward induction method to solve the game.  
Li and Jayaweera (2011) proposed a two-level model in utility companies’ level. In 
first stage the weighted sum of generation cost and operation delay cost for the utility 
is minimized as a convex optimization. In second stage using a game theory approach, 
a Vickrey auction is run for scheduling demands to maximize social welfare for the 
users. They showed truthful bidding is a weakly dominant strategy for all costumers in 
a one-time Vickrey auction. One of the disadvantages of this model is that demands for 
appliances are not specifically determined and they assumed demands are divisible. 
Samadi and Schober (2011) proposed a Vickrey Clarke Groves based mechanism for 
the scheduling model in (Mohsenian-Rad, Wong et al., 2010) to maximize social 
welfare in which users reveal their truthful utility functions.  
Fan (2011) used a different approach and proposed a distributed framework for demand 
response and user adaption in smart Grid based on congestion pricing concept in 
Internet traffic control.  Applying differential equation, they found game equilibrium 
and showed load can be shifted by users through pricing strategies. 
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There are few agent based models in energy management area. Vandael and Boucké 
(2010) proposed a multi agent model for demand management of the plug-in hybrid 
vehicles. Vytelingum and Voice (2010) proposed a game agent based model for 
optimizing storage devices strategies. They proved the Nash solution and empirically 
showed the convergence to the Nash solution. They discussed the learning curve of the 
agents and showed that when learning rate is low, the social welfare is maximum. Their 
game approach implied that when about 38% of the population owns storage devices, 
the social welfare is the maximum.  
Algorithm based models are basically about randomly assigning consumptions. Lee 
and Park (2011a, 2011b) presented a genetic algorithm and an assignment heuristic for 
scheduling of appliances. A summary of the studies on Demand Response modeling is 
presented in  
Table 3. 
This dissertation is based upon combining the two areas of research, energy equilibrium 
and demand response modeling, which to the best of the author’s knowledge has not 
been studied previously. The only study which is related (Kiani Bejestani and 
Annaswamy, 2010) modeled market equilibrium and demand response through a 
MLCP model considering ISO, consumers and generating companies. However, their 
approach has major differences from this study. Their model does not consider any 
hierarchy of decision making among decision makers and, more importantly, their 
demand response program is very general and only determines quantities and not 
schedule of demand/supply. Storage capability and location-based decision are not 
supported. They also assume exogenous bidding prices for participants and use LMP 
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for market pricing. Sellers and buyers are separate entities. The study is mainly focused 
on market design, not demand management. Kiani and Annaswamy (2011) improved 
their work with a different approach to allow information exchange among dominant 
players such as real time price, congestion price, generation and consumption level and 
captured the dynamics of the real time market using the state-based game. They also 
investigated the stability of model under renewable energy and region of attraction 
uncertainty. Table 4 shows their work specifications and their differences from this 
research. 
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Chapter 3: Market Mechanism and Modeling 
Problem Structure 
Rules and structure of the market determines most of the interactions among 
participants in the market. In this chapter, the system mechanism, different layers of 
market, market players’ role and all other assumptions made through this study are 
introduced. 
Dealing with One Large and Complex System: Layers of Smart Grid 
As mentioned earlier, smart grid in its real size is a very large and complex system. 
Dealing with this large and complex system in real time is a real challenge. One way 
to overcome this issue is to decompose the whole system into different layers while 
considering the connection among them. This study tries to capture these connections 
and picture the whole system as a puzzle with several pieces. It then target each piece 
and models it. Then model all pieces’ relations and glue them together and complete 
the puzzle. 
There are several national electric power markets in USA, such as California (CAISO), 
New England (ISO-NE), and PJM (Figure 2). Each national market has several control 
regions (Figure 3). To model the market in Smart Grid it is assumed that each control 
region contains several zones. Zones include all users willing to participate in the 
market directly such as households in addition to all the retailers having customers in 





Figure 2 Electric power markets: national overview3 
 
Figure 3 PJM control regions4 
willing to participate in the market directly and have transferred responsibility of 
controlling their appliances and electricity trades to their retailers. Zone sizes may 
differ depending on regional characteristics and infrastructure. This market structure is 
                                                 




not limiting and could be applied to current system if one assumes all households are 
required to choose a retailer to act on their behalf in the market. 
Considering the above-mentioned structure, three main layers are introduced in this 
study for the Smart Grid: Zonal, Regional, and Cross Regionals. The first layer is in 
the Zonal layer in which households and local retailers are SDR players in the market. 
Generating companies and big suppliers such as BGE and PEPCO who are willing to 
provide electricity to that zone are playing as BGFs. Finally a Zonal ISO clears the 
market and manages the distribution network. At the second layer which is the Regional 
level, each Regional market operator such as PJM and CAISO would act as an ISO and 
clears and manages the transmission network. All suppliers and large generating firms 
which have participated in zonal markets which are covered by that Regional market 
would act as SDR while their supply commitments to zonal markets would become 
their responsibility and demands. All other Regional markets willing to import or 
export electricity to that specific Regional market have the role of BGFs in that market. 
Finally, in the third layer, Cross Regional market, a higher level entity such as 
government would play the role of ISO. Regional markets such as CAISO and PJM 
would act as SDRs in the system while their supply commitments would become their 
responsibilities. All other countries and markets willing to trade in the Cross Regional 
level with the above-mentioned market would act as BGFs in the system. This assumed 





Figure 4 Electricity market structure and roles 
This dissertation is focused on designing and modeling a market which reflects the 
interaction among all decision makers and their best strategies for their decision making 
problems at the Zonal level as the smallest piece of the puzzle. However, considering 
all the role adjustments defined above for the participants in different layers, without 
loss of generality, the model would be applicable to all other layers as well. Since the 
most difficult layer with the largest number of participants is the Zonal level, this study 
focuses on this layer of market. Thus, from this point on the word “market” refers to 
“Zonal market”. The market is modeled as a one-leader multi-follower Stackelberg 
game. Equilibriums of BGFs oligopoly and SDRs perfect competition in the lower level 
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are modeled as optimization problems for each individual, while ISO’s decision 
problem is in the upper level as the leader of the market.  
Market Mechanism and Assumptions 
Based on an extensive interview and survey among 93 institutions from all over the 
world during 3 years, Sovacool explored the most favored policy mechanisms for 
renewables and energy efficiency (Sovacool, 2009). Analysis of the results showed the 
most favorable mechanisms with the strongest support are eliminating subsidies, 
altering electricity prices, forcing utilities to adopt renewables, and increasing funding 
for renewable power through a national system benefit charge. The proposed 
mechanism and integrated demand response model in this study promote the most 
important recommended policy mechanisms in the mentioned study through different 
policies and rules. Following is the general market structure and assumptions in the 
mechanism.  
An electricity distribution network consists of several nodes and lines connecting nodes 
together. The network may not be a complete graph, and electricity is transmitted 
between nodes through the links based on their capacity and limits and the network’s 
specifications. Kamat and Oren (2004) provide a detailed literature review on models 
with transmission constraints besides transmission rights and pricing. Losses in 
transmission networks raise the nonlinearity issue in modeling and add significant 
complexity to the network problem (Chao and Peck, 1996). Hobbs and Drayton (2008) 
studied a one level Cournot game among generating firms and ISO, considering 
quadratic resistance losses and phase shifters in controllable DC lines. They showed 
the effectiveness of the considerations on prices and generation for both competitive 
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and Cournot models through examples. They claimed that in the competitive solution, 
congestion is more important than losses due to increase of flows under competition 
for higher loads which worsens the congestion, while in the Cournot solution price 
differences because of losses are more important due to higher expenses to ISO which 
makes up expenses. So they concluded that in oligopoly models considering losses are 
more important than in competitive markets. Practical models of competition among 
power generators use simplified models of transmission costs and constraints in order 
to be tractable. However, linearized DC models are used in oligopoly models due to 
two main reasons: existence of solutions and also computational costs. Consequently, 
since in this study perfect competition is assumed, considering linearized lossless DC 
network is a justified assumption. 
Subscribers, users and suppliers of electricity are all distributed over the network and 
located at nodes, which means there can be more than one participant at each node. 
Participants are either a BGF or a SDR with individual goals and limitations. Their 
strategies are influenced by the hierarchies of their decision levels in the system. 
In the zonal layer of the market, SDRs are all Subscribers to Demand Response 
program who are willing to participate in the market through communication with the 
network and could be households, small companies, schools, or retailers. Any 
household or user in the system can choose to participate in the market directly with a 
smart meter or transfer the responsibility to a retailer by adopting their plans and 
services and give them the right for controlling their appliances. BGFs are Big 
Generating Firms who own the big generators all over the network and have the power 
of affecting prices considerably with their strategies. ISO is the Independent System 
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Operator who is responsible for clearing the market and managing the whole system 
and transmission network. This structure is not limiting and still allows a BGF to act 
as an ISO if it owns the distribution network. However, in general, allowing suppliers 
to be owners of distribution networks leads to unfair distribution of market power 
among suppliers which is not in the best interest of suppliers or consumers. So in order 
to eliminate the conflict of interests and also consider the social welfare for the society 
a third party should be in charge of managing the system which here is called ISO. This 
confirms the conclusion from (Neuhoff, Barquin et al., 2005) on seeing system operator 
as a strategic agent.  
Since ISO manages the system with hierarchy, all other decision makers should follow 
its decision while competing with each other in the lower level. This type of market 
could be modeled as a one-leader multi-followers Stackelberg game in which ISO is 
the leader in the upper level and all other players are followers in the lower level while 
deciding on their strategies based on the leader’s decision. Stackelberg games were first 
proposed in 1934. This type of formulation is mostly appropriate for games with 
sequential moves among players (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, Gibbons, 1992).  
Figure 5 shows categories of decision makers and hierarchy of decision levels in the 
zonal market in Smart Grid. 
At each time instance, a SDR can buy or generate electricity from the grid or his 
generator and consume or store it, and/or he can sell or reserve electricity from his 
generator or extra energy stored in his batteries or appliances to the grid. Each SDR 





Figure 5 Market structure in Smart Grid 
and generation capacity with a set of locations and time intervals at which they can be 
plugged into the network. For example, one can plug his electrical vehicle into the 
network both at his office when he is at work or at his house any time after he gets 
back. However, his preference value and cost may differ at each time and location. The 
problem for each SDR would be when, where, and how much to generate, consume, 
reserve, sell or buy electricity to or from the network at each time step during a time 
horizon in order to satisfy demands, generation and reserve constraints in addition to 
network limitations while competing with other players over maximizing his individual 
welfare. This is a dynamic non-cooperative Cournot game among SDRs on maximizing 
individual welfares through supply/demand scheduling strategies. Dynamic energy 
scheduling for appliances is on rolling horizon and demand shifting basis. To picture 
the scale of participants, it is possible to have each costumer participate in the market 
individually, or having one or several retailers in each zone acting on behalf of 
costumers while considering each household’s payoff function individually, or having 
both options available to users. The model which is proposed is not limiting in this 
aspect and can cover any of these scenarios as discussed previously. 
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BGFs compete in an oligopoly game on their generation, storage and trade quantities 
as Cournot players to maximize their revenue while the price in the market is 
determined based on the market’s inverse supply function. BGFs can be located 
anywhere in the grid and generation cost is a function of time and location. BGFs 
willing to provide supply to a zone may announce their maximum generating capacity 
assigned to that zone. The maximum capacity for each zone for each BGF can be 
determined based on stochastic demand estimation techniques which are out of the 
scope of this research. 
ISO is operating the distribution network and is responsible for clearing the market. As 
a Cournot player, ISO decides on trades’ (imports/exports) quantities for each player 
at each time instance and node of the network with hierarchy over all other players in 
the system. As an operator its goal is to motivate green energy consumption and 
reducing peak demands through rewarding local energy consumptions while meeting 
the networks’ constraints. Each big generating firm has to pay a fee to system 
coordinator (ISO) for using the electricity network, while ISO gives credit to small 
users exporting electricity to network which is a function of location and time. It is 
worth mentioning that the ISO objective in the current system is either revenue or social 
welfare maximization. However, in this study it is assumed that a new system is 
designed in which the goal is not to collect revenue but it is to expand the use of green 
and distributed energy in the system. To do so the ISO, as a non-profit entity, is 
motivating users to use local electricity by minimizing its income from the defined 
process. Comparison of different ISO objective would be an interesting future work.  
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The overall problem is to solve the defined real time operational decision making 
problems simultaneously. At each point in time, each SDR announces its demand, 
supply, storage quantities, and utility function; each BGF announces its maximum 
generating and storage capacities dedicated to that zone; and ISO depicts the network’s 
constraints. Output from the model would be the schedule of appliances for SDRs, 
schedule of generation and storage for BGFs and allowable trades (import/exports) in 
the Network.  
In order to incentivize businesses, utilities and big generating firms to invest in 
renewables, the proposed model maximizes their revenue as decision makers of the 
system.  Moreover, the defined market mechanism relies on unbundling generation, 
transmission, and distribution providers in order to eliminate power monopoly in the 
market and maximize social benefits. This would increase public participation in the 
system and results in a perfect competition with higher supply diversification. 
Additionally, considering each consumer’s individual utility function in maximizing 
its individual welfare is a green light for users to engage in the market. 
Based on experimental studies giving frequent feedback to consumer would help 
reducing demands (Becker, Seligman et al., 1979). The other aspect of the proposed 
mechanism is to inform consumers of energy efficiency and renewable sources. This 
will be possible through real time two way communications between users and 
suppliers and the grid. Real time data such as demand distributions and historical 
consumption trends would be among information available to all participants in the 
system. This would help consumers understand how their consumption behavior and 
decision affects their bills.  
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However, sending information without having real time prices implemented and 
appropriate models for benefiting from these information would only have slight 
behavioral effect (Geller, 1981). Even making use of green technology mandates or 
incentives without using real time prices would not send right signals to consumers and 
so would not be beneficial. In the proposed mechanism, there is no cap for electricity 
prices in the market. Prices are determined in real time based on available supply 
capacities in the market and would be a good signal of consumption and peak times 
during the day to consumers. On the other hand, eliminating caps will likely result in 
higher prices which may hurt lower income families and poorer households. Nodal 
price functions are a good reflection of socioeconomic characteristics of the area and 
their parameters may be set based on level of poverty in each area. Moreover, in order 
to protect these groups, this mechanism is capable of considering different solutions 
such as offering subset of concessions to lower income families and households. That 
may include discounts on the bills, special loans such as loans for upgrading their 
energy efficiency systems or tax credits for installing more efficient systems, rebates, 
or implementing feed-in-tariffs (FIT) for suppliers of green and renewable resources. 
These offers are not unrealistic and are currently being used in some states such as 
California and New York and some countries such as Denmark and Australia 
(Sovacool, 2009). Subsidies for electricity related fuels have existed since 1880. Using 
the proposed mechanism it is possible to use these subsidies in promoting distributed 
energies and green energy technologies instead of just reducing electricity prices 
through payments to big suppliers and transmission companies. Instead it provided 
loans to local suppliers and households. Even increasing prices without having all other 
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aspects in consideration would not help (Aune, 2007).  So in general, any successful 
mechanism should be a comprehensive one in order to overcome all the issues and 
deficiencies. The proposed mechanism in this study, as discussed above, covers all 
these aspects.  
Here is a list of assumptions made throughout this study: 
 The distribution network is a linearized lossless DC network. 
 All players in the system are rational. 
 Appliances could be only located at one node at each time step. 
 BGFs are individually owned and their maximum dedicated capacities to each zone are 
estimated and known. 
 Without loss of generality BGFs do not have demands. A BGF with demands could be 
divided into a BGF without demands and a SDR with demands only. 
 Demands are less desirable as they delay. That is, consumption preference functions 
are assumed to be Gaussian functions. Although there is no penalty for not meeting 
demands, and it is assumed that if any demand request is not satisfied the problem 
would be infeasible, this assumption is not limiting. Considering the available extra 
supply capacities during off peak hours, results showed that the infeasibility issue is 
overcome. This assumption makes the lower level problem convex, which is necessary 
in proving solution existence. 
 Generation cost for BGFs and SDRs, and reward fees are exogenous and depending on 
time and location. 
 Market price is the inverse of the supply function and is assumed to be linear and 
decreasing with positive parameters. Since the market is modeled for each zone, the 
prices would be Zonal prices and all users in one geographical zone with similar 
socioeconomics behaviors have the same prices. 
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 SDRs have access to trade information through their smart meters. 
 Dynamic problem is based rolling horizon with hourly steps.  
Problem Formulation 
It is of interest to see how market structure and rights in decision making would affect 
competition and demand management in the energy system. There may be questions 
regarding determining roles’ eligibility on making decisions over some variables. i.e., 
why not ISO be the only entity deciding on the trade values. So, for the sake of 
comparison, the problem defined in previous section is formulated from two aspects. 
The first, which is more likely, is when trade amounts are decision variables for all 
decision makers. This means trade amounts are variables in both levels. The second is 
giving the right of decision making over trade amounts only to the ISO. This means 
trades are only variable in one level (upper level). In the first case, there is a complete 
competition over all decision variables in the lower level and participants in the market 
can make their own decisions over their trade values. However, in the second case, 
despite having a competition in the lower level, the ISO has more control over the 
system and controls one of the variables solely with respect to other participants’ 
decisions. Comparing these two different policies in the market is of interest and will 
show if supervising a competition would make any difference in a system. These two 
perceptions make some differences in relations among participants in the system and 
also in the approach for solving the problem. In this section both concepts are 
formulated as One-Way and Two-Way models which refer to problems with trade 




The general form of the bi-level model called Two-Way model would be as follows: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑥   𝑓(𝑥)  
𝑠. 𝑡.   𝑥 ∈ 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑔(𝑥, 𝑦): (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ 𝐶(𝑥, 𝑦)}  
As opposed to the One-Way model which is  
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑥   𝑓(𝑥) 
𝑠. 𝑡.   𝑥 ∈ 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑔(𝑦): 𝑦 ∈ 𝐶(𝑥, 𝑦)} 
Preliminaries and Problem Parameters 
Parameters and definitions used in this dissertation are as follows. 
N: Set of nodes in the network 
L: Set of lines in the network 
T: Set of time steps in a time horizon 
I: Set of SDRs 
G: Set of BGFs 
T0: First time interval in the time horizon 
A(i): Set of appliances of SDR 𝑖 
N(i, a): Set of locations where appliance 𝑎 of SDR 𝑖 can be plugged into the network 
Trequest𝑖,𝑎: Initial time of request for DEM𝑖,𝑎  
 
 
TE𝑖,𝑎,𝑛: Earliest possible time for appliance 𝑎 of SDR 𝑖 to connect to network in  
node 𝑛 




V𝑖,𝑎,𝑡,𝑛: Preference function for consuming one unit of electricity for appliance 𝑎  
of SDR 𝑖 at node 𝑛 at time 𝑡 
VCHAR𝑖,𝑎,𝑡: Preference function for storing one unit of electricity for appliance 𝑎  
of SDR 𝑖 at time 𝑡 
C𝑖,𝑎,𝑡,𝑛: Generation cost of one unit of electricity by appliance 𝑎 of SDR 𝑖 at node 𝑛  
at time 𝑡 
CR𝑖,𝑎,𝑡: Storage cost for one unit of electricity for appliance 𝑎 of SDR 𝑖 at time 𝑡       
DEM𝑖,𝑎: Demand request for appliance 𝑎 of SDR 𝑖  
CHAR𝑖,𝑎,𝑡: Charge request for appliance 𝑎 of SDR 𝑖 at time 𝑡  
Q𝑖,𝑎: Generation capacity for appliance 𝑎 of SDR 𝑖  
RCAP𝑖,𝑎: Storage capacity for appliance 𝑎 of SDR 𝑖  
R0𝑖,𝑎: Initial storage quantity for appliance 𝑎 of SDR 𝑖 at T0 
P𝑛,𝑡: Nodal export fee/reward fee at time 𝑡 
K𝑙: Thermal capacity of line 𝑙 
D𝑛,𝑙: Power transfer distribution factor from node 𝑛 to line 𝑙 
QG𝑔: Generation capacity for generator 𝑔  
RG𝑔: Storage capacity for generator 𝑔 
CG𝑔,𝑡: Generation cost for one unit of electricity by BGF 𝑔 at time 𝑡       
CRG𝑔,𝑡: Storage cost for one unit of electricity for generator 𝑔 at time 𝑡       
GNODE𝑔: Node at which generator 𝑔 is located  




dem𝑖,𝑎,𝑡,𝑛: Consumption quantity for appliance 𝑎 of SDR 𝑖 in node 𝑛 at time 𝑡 
q𝑖,𝑎,𝑡,𝑛: Supply quantity for appliance 𝑎 of SDR 𝑖 in node 𝑛 at time 𝑡 
r𝑖,𝑎,𝑡: Storage level for appliance 𝑎 of SDR 𝑖 at time 𝑡 
x𝑖,𝑎,𝑡,𝑛: Trade (import(+) or export(−)) quantity for appliance 𝑎 of SDR 𝑖 in node 𝑛 at time 𝑡 
qg𝑔,𝑡: Generation quantity for generator 𝑔 at time 𝑡 
rg𝑔,𝑡: Storage level for generator 𝑔 at time 𝑡 
xg𝑔,𝑡: Export quantity for generator 𝑔 at time 𝑡 
expo𝑛,𝑡: Total nodal export by all SDRs from node 𝑛 at time 𝑡 
Interactions among all decision variables in the problem are shown in Figure 6, Figure 
7, and Figure 8. 
 
Figure 6 SDR’s decision problem at each point of time for each appliance 
 




Figure 8 ISO’s decision problem at each point of time at each node 
Two-Way Model: Model with Trades in both levels 
ISO Decision Problem 
ISO’s decision problem is as follows: 
Min.∑ ∑ Pn,t. (∑ xgg,t(gϵG|gnode(g) = n)  − 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑛,𝑡n∈Nt )  
(3. 1) 
Subject to: 
expo𝑛,𝑡 ≤ 0   ; ∀n, t 
(3. 2) 
expo𝑛,𝑡 ≤ ∑ ∑ x𝑖,𝑎,𝑡,𝑛aϵA(i)i∈I      ; ∀n, t 
(3. 3) 
∑ ∑ ∑ xi,a,t,nnϵN(i,a)aϵA(i)iϵI − ∑ xgg,tg∈G = 0 ;  ∀t  
(3. 4) 




xi,a,t,n 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒 ; ∀i, aϵA(i), nϵN(i, a), t 
(3. 6) 
xgg,t ≥ 0  ;    ∀g, t 
(3. 7) 
ISO is a governmental entity or a third party whose goal is to motivate energy demand 
management participation and green energy consumption. Consequently, ISO intends 
to encourage users to use local generators which are mostly non-fossil generators and 
to generate their own electricity as much as possible in order to benefit from disperse 
energy capacities. To do so system operator is charging BGFs for using lines while 
paying users who exports electricity. The charge and payment is based on the location 
and time of use. ISO minimizes total income from these fees and maximized total 
rewards (3. 1). Fees are assumed to be exogenous and nodal based. (3. 2) and (3. 3) are 
total amount of exports by all SDRs at any time from each node. BGFs may include 
their fees for use of lines in their costs while selling electricity to market. But eventually 
this would be reflected in the behavior of users by reducing use of fossil generated 
electricity.  
(3. 4) is the flow conservation constraint. Equation (3. 5) is the thermal limit on lines 
in which Kl is thermal capacity of line l. 𝑥 values are import/export quantities at each 
node which could be negative. Their PTDF and Dn,l is the amount of flow 
increased/decreased on each link due to injection/withdrawal of electricity at each 
node. Since the flow could be in both directions on each line, this constraint should 
hold for both positive and negative values of the limits. Constraints (3. 6), and (3. 7) 
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indicate import and export variables in the grid in this decision making problem. The 
ISO model is a linear model with linear constraints. 
BGF Decision Problem 
In the lower level the first set of decision makers are the big generators and big 
suppliers. They compete with each other for supplying market’s demand while 
maximizing their revenue.  
∀gϵG:  
Max. ∑ ((Z − W∑ xggg,tggϵG )xgg,t − CGg,t. qgg,t − CRGg,t. rgg,t)t    
(3. 8) 
Subject to: 
qgg,t − QGg   ≤ 0      ;        ∀t    
(3. 9) 
qgg,t − xgg,t  − rgg,t + rgg,t−1 = 0       ;        ∀t      
(3. 10) 
rgg,t − RGg   ≤ 0      ;        ∀t 
(3. 11) 
xgg,t, rgg,t,  qgg,t ≥ 0 ; ∀t 
(3. 12) 
This model is solved for each BGF in the system. Solving for all BGFs optimal 
strategies, the Nash equilibrium (if exists) to the game will be found. Existence of 
equilibrium to the problem is discussed in Chapter 4. Equation (3. 8) is the objective 
function and is maximizing revenue which is the difference between generator’s 
income and cost. Price in this market is assumed to be equal to the inverse supply 
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function which is a linear function. As supply increases in the market, price decreases 
and so it has a negative slope. In this model, since zonal markets are considered, prices 
would be zonal prices. People living in one geographical zone have similar 
socioeconomics behaviors. So considering similar physical conditions in a zone such 
as severe weather conditions, and similar social economics behaviors, it is justified to 
assign each zone one price based on the zonal supply and demand function. A question 
may arise here: How realistic is using inverse supply function for setting the market 
price? There are different approaches in setting the market price. Each has its own 
advantages and disadvantages and is upon designer’s preference. Inverse supply 
function is chosen here to capture the game among suppliers in the market. Using 
shadow prices in determining the real time price could be also interesting. However, 
this makes the problem nonlinear and even more complex with such a large size and 
dynamic nature. Studying shadow prices and comparison to current inverse supply 
function would be of interest and is left for future investigations. 
Constraint (3. 9) is the generation capacity for each generator at each time step. (3. 10) 
is flow conservation constraint for each generator at each time step which includes all 
the generations, sales and difference in the storage level of the storage system. (3. 11) 
is the limit on storage capacity of the generators. Although large scale electricity 
storage is still not very efficient and economically justified, research path in this area 
of technology is very promising. Being one of the highlights of Smart Grid in the future 
(Von Dollen, 2009), storage capacities are considered in this modeling, though this 
assumption is not limiting at all. Finally (3. 12) are the variables in this decision making 
problem. Each generator is solving a quadratic programming problem. The objective 
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function is concave while the feasible region is a convex hull due to linearity of all the 
constraints. So each generator will have a global solution for its concave objective 
function.  
SDR Decision Problem 
The last set of decision makers are all subscribers in the system. These are the ones 
who declared their interest in participating in the market and demand response program 
through smart meters. There could be retailers who themselves cover a set of 
subscribers and customers and act on behalf of them considering each individual payoff 
function. In this problem each subscriber tries to find his optimal schedule of demand 
and supply to meet all his demand and limitations while maximizing his individual 
welfare. Since SDRs follow ISO’s decisions, their optimal schedule will also comply 
with network constraints.  
∀iϵI: 
Max.  ∑ (∑ ∑ (Vi,a,t,n. demi,a,t,nnϵN(i,a)aϵA(i)t − Ci,a,t,n. qi,a,t,n − (Z −
W∑ xgg,tgϵG ). xi,a,n,t) + ∑ (VCHARi,a,t. CHARi,a,t − CRi,a,t. ri,a,taϵA(i) ))                                                              
(3. 13) 
Subject to: 
∑ ∑ demi,a,t,nnϵN(i,a)t = DEMi,a       ;        ∀aϵA(i)    
(3. 14) 
riat − CHARi,a,t ≥ 0       ;        ∀aϵA(i), t  
(3. 15) 




riat − RCAPi,a ≤ 0       ;        ∀aϵA(i), t 
(3. 17) 
∑ qi,a,T0,nnϵN(i,a) + ∑ xi,a,T0,nnϵN(i,a) − ri,a,T0 + R0i,a − ∑ demi,a,T0,nnϵN(i,a) =
0     ;       ∀aϵA(i)  
(3. 18) 
∑ qi,a,t,nnϵN(i,a) + ∑ xi,a,t,nnϵN(i,a) − ri,a,t + ri,a,(t−1) − ∑ demi,a,t,nnϵN(i,a) −
CHARi,a,t−1 = 0     ;       ∀aϵA(i), t ≠ T0  
(3. 19) 
ri,a,t, qi,a,t,n, demi,a,t,n ≥ 0    ;     ∀aϵA(i), nϵN(i, a), t 
(3. 20) 
xi,a,t,n 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒 ; ∀i, aϵA(i), nϵN(i, a), t 
(3. 21) 
In the objective function (3. 13), each subscriber maximizes his individual welfare. 
Individual welfare is the benefit each subscriber gains minus all his costs. Utility 
function is defined as the value of the electricity consumption for the subscriber at each 
time instance. The utility function for each subscriber’s energy consumption is assumed 
to be Gaussian and convex which means user’s preference is to consume energy as 







Figure 9 SDRs schematic consumption utility function 
SDR’s energy generation cost includes operational cost of devices such as solar panels 
and electric vehicles, plus device’s depreciation cost. Storage cost is also assumed to 
be sum of operational and depreciation cost per unit of electricity storage in storage 
devices and batteries. The price that a buyer pays or a seller earns from trading 
electricity is the inverse supply function of the BGFs.  
Equation (3. 14) assures all the demands are met. This is a hard constraint and may 
cause infeasibility if sufficient supply is not available in the network. It is possible to 
make it a soft constraint by changing the strict equality to less or equal constraint; 
however, this would cause semi-satisfied demands. Constraint (3. 15) is batteries’ 
demand satisfaction. For example, one may want to have his electric vehicle being fully 
charged by a specific time, this constraint would consider this request. 
Constraint (3. 16) is generation capacity limit of appliances. Constraint (3. 17) is the 
storage capacity constraint. Constraints (3. 18) and (3. 19) are flow conservation at each 
time step for each appliance. And finally, constraints (3. 20) and (3. 21) define variable 
conditions. 
As it is clear in model, BGFs’ variables are affecting SDRs’ decisions, but that is not 
true in reverse. This results in a hidden hierarchy of BGFs over SDRs. That is because 
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SDRs’ individual production and consumption levels are very small comparing to 
BGFs’ level of production. This decreases their effect on BGFs’ decision problem in 
general. However, to include their effect on the market behavior, indirect parameters 
and techniques such as demand functions and congestion pricing are suggested. In this 
study, demand and supply function is used to capture the behavior. Studying each 
individual’s influence on the market makes would be interesting and is among future 
work. 
Stackelberg Mathematical Model 
The Nash-Cournot game defined in this problem has three sets of players: ISO, BGFs, 
and SDRs. Optimization problem for each player in the game is described before. In 
this section the one leader multi-follower Stackelberg game among ISO as the leader, 
and BGFs and SDRs as its followers is presented. In this problem, ISO minimizes its 
objective by decision over trade levels given the response of the followers. Summary 
of the Stackelberg game model is illustrated in Table 5.  
In the main model of this study, Two-Way model, every participant shares the power 
of making decisions over trade amounts in the system. Here, the other model is 
formulated and evaluated with giving this power only to ISO. In other words, instead 
of having the market settle equilibrium through a competition, it gives one entity the 
power to control one of the variables for the whole system as an ISO. To evaluate such 
a system, the problem is modeled as a bi-level model in which ISO in the upper level 
maintains network constraints while trade amounts are variables only for ISO in the 
upper level and dictated to all other participants in the lower level. In reality, giving the 
right of decision making only to ISO would decrease level of supply diversification. 
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Table 5 Summary of one leader multi-follower Stackelberg game: Two-Way model 
One-Way Model: Model with Trades solely in ISO level 
The One-Way model would be the same as Two-Way model with only deference in 
variable definitions. The One-Way model with modified variables is illustrated in Table 
6.  






Level Hierarchy Player Objective Main Variable Equation(s) 
Upper Level Leader ISO Min. Income xi,a,t,n,xgg,t (3. 1)-(3. 7) 
Lower Level Follower BGFs Max. Revenue qgg,t, xgg,t, rgg,t (3. 8)-(3. 12)  




(3. 13)-(3. 21)  
Level Hierarchy Player Objective Main Variable Equation(s) 
Upper 
Level 
Leader ISO Min. Income xi,a,t,n,xgg,t (3. 1)-(3. 7) 
Lower 
Level 
Follower BGFs Max. Revenue qgg,t (3. 8)-(3. 12)  
Follower SDRs Max. Individual Welfare demi,a,t,n,qi,a,t,n,ri,a,t (3. 13)-(3. 21)  
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Chapter 4: Solution Methodology and Validation 
This chapter is dedicated to proving the existence of a solution to the model in order to 
validate the Stackelberg game proposed for integrated demand response and market 
equilibrium in Smart Grid (Table 5). First a brief background on bi-level models is 
provided and the proof follows. The solution approach for the proposed model is 
discussed afterward. 
Background 
“Multilevel optimization problems are mathematical programs which have a subset of 
their variables constrained to be an optimal solution of other programs parameterized 
by their remaining variables” (Vicente and Calamai, 1994). Multilevel optimization is 
mostly related to economical decision making problems such as Stackelberg problems 
in game theory. It has different applications, such as revenue management, congestion 
management, network design problems, principal agent problem, origin destination 
matrix estimation and many more in transportation, management, planning and 
engineering design. In this study it is applied in the area of energy sector. Bi-level 
programming is a generally complex problem and most of studies focus on solving 
simple and small cases.  
Different methodologies in solving Bi-level problems can be categorized as following: 
 Methods based on vertex enumeration: This technique is mainly based on searching 
through different possible nodes in the region. For instance, Bard (Bard, 1983) 
developed grid search algorithm which uses bi-criteria optimization concept for 
solving bi-level programming. Hansen and Jaumard (Hansen, Jaumard et al., 1992) 
developed a branch and bound algorithms for solving bi-level problems based on 
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binding constraints of the followers. Bialas (Bialas, 1984) also proposed a vertex 
search algorithm in the accessible region, though his approach may result in local 
optimum. 
 Methods based on Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions: One of the ideas in solving 
bi-level problems is converting the bi-level to a one level problem by adding the 
optimality conditions of the lower level to the upper level. Adding the KKT conditions 
of the lower level to the upper level, there will be an MPEC problem which is a one 
level problem to solve. However, due to the non-convex and non-smooth 
characteristics of a MPEC, normally solving such a problem is a difficult and complex 
process (Ban, Liu et al., 2006). Judice and Faustino (Júdice and Faustino, 1992) used 
hybrid enumerative method to develop a sequential LCP algorithm for solving MPEC 
problem which performs well in medium sized problems, but does not guarantee 
solution in all cases. White and Anandalingam (White and Anandalingam, 1993) 
benefited from penalty function for satisfying the complementarity constraints. MIP 
techniques can be also used in solving the corresponding MIP of the MPEC such as 
benders decomposition (Gabriel, Shim et al., 2010). Audet and Savard (Audet, Savard 
et al., 2007) proposed a finite branch and cut algorithm for solving the linear bi-level 
programming based on new classes of valid cuts in the corresponding MIP problem. 
Moreover, Bard and Moore (Bard and Moore, 1990)  reformulated the problem as a 
standard mathematical program by exploiting the follower’s Kuhn–Tucker conditions. 
Then a branch and bound scheme suggested by Fortuny-Amat and McCarl (Fortuny-
Amat and McCarl, 1981) is used to enforce the underlying complementary slackness 
conditions. The algorithm performs well in small problems with 100 variables. 
 Methods based on heuristics: As the problem size increases solving bi-level problems 
get even more complex. Some studies used heuristic and meta-heuristic methods for 
dealing with this issue. (Sahin and Ciric, 1998) incorporated simulated annealing 
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method. However, it was inefficient in solving even small problems. (Hejazi, 
Memariani et al., 2002) developed a genetic algorithm, but they recognized the 
difficulty in generating feasible chromosomes. Finally, (Gendreau, Marcotte et al., 
1996) developed a hybrid Tabu ascent algorithm based on penalty functions to find 
and improve the initial feasible solution which is a problem specific algorithm. 
 Nonlinear approaches: One other technique is to see the optimality conditions of the 
lower level as a type of nonlinear constraints. Having this idea, nonlinear approaches 
can be used for solving the problem. (Fletcher* and Leyffer, 2004, Leyffer, 2003, 
Leyffer and Munson, 2010, Ralph* and Wright, 2004) used this approach in their 
papers. 
There are great comprehensive surveys on bi-level programming problems and their 
solution techniques to which interested readers are referred (Colson, Marcotte et al., 
2005, Dempe, 2002, Vicente and Calamai, 1994).   
Two-Way model 
MPEC Model 
The game among participants and operator in Smart Grid is modeled as a one-leader 
multi-follower Stackelberg game. Stackelberg games are bi-level optimization models 
due to the hierarchy of decision making among players. One approach in solving 
Stackelberg problems is to substitute the lower level problems with their optimality 
conditions. This results in a one level MPEC problem. Convexity of BGFs’ quadratic 
and SDRs’ linear models makes the first order optimality condition and so Karush 
Kuhn Tucker optimality conditions (Bazaraa, Sherali et al., Cottle, Pang et al., 2009), 
both necessary and sufficient. As a result equilibrium for BGFs and SDRs’ game could 
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be found through solving KKT optimality conditions for all SDRs and BGFs together. 
Dual variables (ε) for BGFs’ constraints are shown in (4. 1) and (4. 3): 
qgg,t − QGg   ≤ 0      ;        ∀gϵG, t  − − εg,t
1   
(4. 1) 
qgg,t − xgg,t  − rgg,t + rgg,t−1 = 0      ;        ∀gϵG, t  − − εg,t
2   
(4. 2) 
rgg,t − RGg   ≤ 0      ;        ∀gϵG, t  − − εg,t
3  
(4. 3) 
KKT conditions for BGFs would be: 
0 ≤ −Z + 2Wxgg,t + W∑ xggg,tgg≠g − εg,t
2 ⊥ xgg,t ≥ 0; ∀gϵG, t    
(4. 4) 
0 ≤ CGg,t + εg,t
1 + εg,t
2 ⊥ qgg,t ≥ 0; ∀gϵG, t    
(4. 5) 
0 ≤ CRGg,t + εg,t+1
2 (t < T) − εg,t
2 + εg,t
3 ⊥ rgg,t ≥ 0; ∀gϵG, t    
(4. 6) 
0 ≤ QGg − qgg,t ⊥ εg,t
1 ≥ 0      ;        ∀gϵG, t   
(4. 7) 
qgg,t − xgg,t  − rgg,t + rgg,t−1(t > T0) = 0,    εg,t
2    free     ;        ∀gϵG, t    
(4. 8) 
0 ≤ RGg − rgg,t ⊥ εg,t
3 ≥ 0      ;        ∀gϵG, t   
(4. 9) 
And for SDRs model dual variables (β) are assigned as in (4. 10)-(4. 15): 
 
 60 
∑ ∑ demi,a,t,nnϵN(i,a)t = DEMi,a       ;        ∀iϵI, aϵA(i)   − − βi,a
1   
(4. 10) 
riat − CHARi,a,t ≥ 0      ;     ∀iϵI, aϵA(i), t|CHARi,a,t exists − − βi,a,t
2   
(4. 11) 
∑ qi,a,t,nnϵN(i,a) − Qi,a   ≤ 0      ;        ∀iϵI, aϵA(i), t|Qi,a exists  − − βi,a,t
3   
(4. 12) 
riat − RCAPi,a ≤ 0       ;        ∀iϵI, aϵA(i), t|RCAPi,a exists − −βi,a,t
4    
(4. 13) 
∑ qi,a,T0,nnϵN(i,a) + ∑ xi,a,T0,nnϵN(i,a) − ri,a,T0 + R0i,a − ∑ demi,a,T0,nnϵN(i,a) =
0       ;      ∀iϵI, aϵA(i)   − − βi,a
5   
(4. 14) 
∑ qi,a,t,nnϵN(i,a) + ∑ xi,a,t,nnϵN(i,a) − ri,a,t + ri,a,(t−1) − ∑ demi,a,t,n −nϵN(i,a)
CHARi,a,t−1 = 0     ;     ∀iϵI, aϵA(i), t ≠ T0   − − βi,a,t
6   
(4. 15) 
Also to have all variables positive in the KKT condition the free trade variable is 
substituted by difference of two positive variable as x = 𝑥+ − 𝑥−. KKT conditions for 
SDRs would be as in (4. 16)-(4. 26): 
0 ≤ Z − W ∑ xg
g,tgϵG
+ βi,a
5 〈t = T0〉 + βi,a,t
6 〈t ≠ T0〉 ⊥ xi,a,t,n
+ ≥ 0; ∀i, aϵA(i), n, t  
(4. 16) 
0 ≤ −Z + W ∑ xg
g,tgϵG
− βi,a
5 〈t = T0〉 − βi,a,t
6 〈t ≠ T0〉 ⊥ xi,a,t,n




0 ≤ −Vi,a,t,n + βi,a
1 − βi,a
5 〈t = T0〉 − βi,a,t
6 〈t ≠ T0〉 ⊥ demi,a,t,n ≥ 0; ∀i, aϵA(i), n, t  
(4. 18) 
0 ≤ Ci,a,t,n + βi,a
3 + βi,a
5 〈t = T0〉 + βi,a,t
6 〈t ≠ T0〉  ⊥ qi,a,t,n ≥  0 ; ∀i, aϵA(i), n, t     
(4. 19) 
0 ≤ CRi,a,t − βi,a,t
2 + βi,a,t
4 − βi,a
5 〈t = T0〉 + βi,a,(t+1)
6 〈t = T0〉 − βi,a,t
6 〈t ≠ T0〉 +
βi,a,(t+1)
6 〈t ≠ T0〉  ⊥ ri,at ≥  0 ;     ∀i, aϵA(i), t    
(4. 20) 
0 ≤ ri,a,t − CHARi,a,t ⊥ βi,a,t
2 ≥ 0       ;        ∀i, aϵA(i), t       
(4. 21) 
0 ≤ Qi,a − ∑ qi,a,t,nnϵN(i,a) ⊥ βi,a,t
3 ≥ 0      ;        ∀i, aϵA(i), t  
(4. 22) 
0 ≤ RCAPi,a − ri,a,t ⊥ βi,a,t
4 ≥ 0       ;        ∀i, aϵA(i), t  
(4. 23) 
∑ ∑ demi,a,t,nnϵN(i,a)t = DEMi,a   ,     βi,a
1    free       ;        ∀i, aϵA(i)         
(4. 24) 
∑ qi,a,T0,nnϵN(i,a) + ∑ (xi,a,t,n
+ − xi,a,t,n
− )nϵN(i,a) − ri,a,T0 + R0i,a − ∑ demi,a,T0,nnϵN(i,a) =
0 , βia
5     free ;   ∀i, aϵA(i)       
(4. 25) 
∑ qi,a,t,nnϵN(i,a) + ∑ (xi,a,t,n
+ − xi,a,t,n
− )nϵN(i,a) − ri,a,t + ri,a,(t−1) − ∑ demi,a,t,nnϵN(i,a) −
CHARi,a,t−1 = 0 , βi,a,t
6   free ; ∀i, aϵA(i), t ≠ T0       
(4. 26)  
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Optimality conditions for the lower level games are now in complementarity form and 
could be added to the upper level problem as a new set of constraints (Chen, Hobbs et 
al., 2006). This would shape a Mathematical Problem with Equilibrium Constraints 
(MPEC) (Cottle, Pang et al., 2009) as summarized in (Table 7). 
Table 7 Summary of one leader multi-follower Stackelberg game- MPEC Two-Way model 
Type Hierarchy Description Equation(s) 
Objective Function Leader ISO Objective Function (3. 1) 
Constraints Leader ISO Constraints (3. 2)-(3. 7) 
Follower BGFs Optimality Conditions (4. 4) -(4. 9) 
Follower SDRs Optimality Conditions (4. 16)-(4. 26) 
 
Although the MPEC has a convex objective function, it is nonlinear due to the presence 
of complementarity constraints. Generally, finding MPECs’ global solution is not easy 
using standard algorithms because of their non-convex feasible region. However, many 
researchers worked on these models to find an appropriate method for finding optimal 
solutions (Ferris and Pang, 1997, Gabriel and Leuthold, 2010, Leyffer and Munson, 
2010). Recent developments are capable of computing local stationary points and make 
MPEC a tractable tool for solving large scale Stackelberg games (Chen, Hobbs et al., 
2006, Leyffer and Munson, 2010). Although solvers such as NLPEC and NPATH are 
available for solving MPECs, the problem mostly gets computationally expensive and 





Many researchers worked on MPEC models to develop an appropriate method for 
finding optimal solutions (Ferris and Pang, 1997, Gabriel and Leuthold, 2010, Leyffer 
and Munson, 2010). One famous approach is using integer programming technique to 
convert the nonlinear MPEC model to MILP.   
Computational tractability of optimization models makes them a favorable approach in 
solving large scale modeling (Ventosa, Baıllo et al., 2005). On the other hand, in games, 
equilibrium models are more appropriate since they can consider players’ strategies in 
the system. If equilibrium models could be converted into optimization models then 
both fitness of models and computational complexities are in favor of the model. So in 
this section the proposed MPEC model is transformed into an integer programming 
model not only to evaluate the applicability of this approach in real world size 
implementation, but also to compare its results with the results of the solution algorithm 
which will be introduced in this study. Integer programming techniques are employed 
and the complementarity constraints are transformed into linear disjunctive constraints 
based on the technique introduced in (Audet, Hansen et al., 1997). 
For any complementarity constraint such as (4. 27), using a dummy binary variable 𝜑 
and a dummy large number M (as an upper bound for the constraint), it can be written 
as (4. 28)-(4. 30): 
 




0 ≤ 𝑓(𝑥) ≤ 𝑀.𝜑          
(4. 28) 
0 ≤ x ≤ M. (1 − 𝜑)       
(4. 29) 
𝜑 ∈ {0,1}          
(4. 30) 
However, the associated MIP model has some disadvantages. Beside difficulties in 
solving the problem in large scale and real time, there would be many BigMs in the 
associated MIP model. Using the approach introduced in (Gabriel, Shim et al., 2010) 
some of the BigMs can be estimated. However, for those not being estimated, 
sensitivity analysis should be conducted. These constants make the problem unstable 
which makes MIP an unreliable approach. 
BigMs for most of constraints are estimated based on their maximum limit or their 
marginal prices. In this study shadow prices on the capacities are assumed to be α times 
their usage cost.  Some other bounds need more investigations. For instance, bound on 
xgg,t in (4. 32) can be estimated based on (4. 37). 
Following the idea, complementarity constraints of BGFs and SDRs in the MPEC 
model introduced in Table 7 can be converted to linear disjunctive constraints using 
dummy binary variables δ and λ  as shown below. The resulting problem is a large MIP 
model which can be solved using integer programming methodologies.  
0 ≤ −Z + 2Wxgg,t + W∑ xggg,tgg≠g − εg,t
2 ≤ M. 𝛿𝑔,𝑡




0 ≤ xgg,t ≤ (RG𝑔 + QG𝑔). (1 − 𝛿𝑔,𝑡
1 )    
(4. 32) 
0 ≤ CGg,t + εg,t
1 + εg,t
2 ≤ M. 𝛿𝑔,𝑡
2   ;   ∀gϵG, t  
(4. 33) 
0 ≤ qgg,t ≤ QGg. (1 − 𝛿𝑔,𝑡
2 )   ;     ∀gϵG, t    
(4. 34) 
0 ≤ QGg − qgg,t ≤ QGg. 𝛿𝑔,𝑡
3       ;        ∀gϵG, t    
(4. 35) 
0 ≤ εg,t
1 ≤ α. CGg,t. (1 − 𝛿𝑔,𝑡
3 )      ;        ∀gϵG, t     
(4. 36) 
qgg,t − xgg,t  − rgg,t + rgg,t−1(t > T0) = 0    ;        ∀gϵG, t          
(4. 37) 
0 ≤ CRGg,t + εg,t+1
2 (t < T) − εg,t
2 + εg,t
3 ≤ M. 𝛿𝑔,𝑡
4   ;   ∀gϵG, t  
(4. 38) 
0 ≤ rgg,t ≤ RGg. (1 − 𝛿𝑔,𝑡
4 )   ;     ∀gϵG, t    
(4. 39) 
0 ≤ RGg − rgg,t ≤ RGg. 𝛿𝑔,𝑡
5       ;        ∀gϵG, t    
(4. 40) 
0 ≤ εg,t
3 ≤ α. CRGg,t. (1 − 𝛿𝑔,𝑡









5 ∈ {0,1}     ;     ∀gϵG, t    
(4. 42) 
εg,t
2      free      ;        ∀gϵG, t    
(4. 43) 
0 ≤ Z − W ∑ xg
g,tgϵG
+ βi,a
5 〈t = T0〉 + βi,a,t
6 〈t ≠ T0〉 ≤ M. 𝜆i,a,t,n
1 ; ∀i, aϵA(i), n, t  
(4. 44) 
0 ≤ xi,a,t,n
+ ≤ M. (1 − 𝜆i,a,t,n
1 ) 
(4. 45) 
0 ≤ −Z + W ∑ xg
g,tgϵG
− βi,a
5 〈t = T0〉 − βi,a,t
6 〈t ≠ T0〉 ≤ M. 𝜆i,a,t,n
2 ; ∀i, aϵA(i), n, t  
(4. 46) 
0 ≤ xi,a,t,n
− ≤ M. (1 − 𝜆i,a,t,n
2 ) 
(4. 47) 
0 ≤ −Vi,a,t,n + βi,a
1 − βi,a
5 〈t = T0〉 − βi,a,t
6 〈t ≠ T0〉  ≤ M. 𝜆i,a,t,n
3  ;  ∀i, aϵA(i), n, t    
(4. 48) 
0 ≤ demi,a,t,n ≤ DEMi,a. (1 − 𝜆i,a,t,n
3 ) ;    ∀i, aϵA(i), n, t    
(4. 49) 
0 ≤ Ci,a,t,n + βi,a
3 + βi,a
5 〈t = T0〉 + βi,a,t
6 〈t ≠ T0〉  ≤ M. 𝜆i,a,t,n
4  ;     ∀i, aϵA(i), n, t    
(4. 50) 
0 ≤ qi,a,t,n ≤ Qi,a. (1 − 𝜆i,a,t,n




0 ≤ CRi,a,t − βi,a,t
2 + βi,a,t
4 − βi,a
5 〈t = T0〉 + βi,a,(t+1)
6 〈t = T0〉 − βi,a,t
6 〈t ≠ T0〉 +
βi,a,(t+1)
6 〈t ≠ T0〉  ≤ M. 𝜆i,a,t
5  ;     ∀i, aϵA(i), t    
(4. 52) 
0 ≤ ri,at ≤ RCAPi,a. (1 − 𝜆i,a,t
5 ) ;    ∀i, aϵA(i), t  
(4. 53) 
0 ≤ ri,a,t − CHARi,a,t ≤ RCAPi,a. 𝜆i,a,t
6        ;        ∀i, aϵA(i), t       
(4. 54) 
0 ≤ βi,a,t
2 ≤ M. (1 − 𝜆i,a,t
6 )  ;  ∀i, aϵA(i), t  
(4. 55) 
0 ≤ Qi,a − ∑ qi,a,t,nnϵN(i,a) ≤ Qi,a. 𝜆i,a,t
7       ;        ∀i, aϵA(i), t       
(4. 56) 
0 ≤ βi,a,t
3 ≤ α.∑ Ci,a,t,nnϵN(i,a) . (1 − 𝜆i,a,t
7 )      ;        ∀i, aϵA(i), t    
(4. 57) 
0 ≤ RCAPi,a − ri,a,t ≤ RCAPi,a. 𝜆i,a,t
8        ;        ∀i, aϵA(i), ts    
(4. 58) 
0 ≤ βi,a,t
4 ≤ α. CRi,a,t. (1 − 𝜆i,a,t
8 )       ;        ∀i, aϵA(i), t         
(4. 59) 




∑ qi,a,T0,nnϵN(i,a) + ∑ (xi,a,t,n
+ − xi,a,t,n
− )nϵN(i,a) − ri,a,T0 + R0i,a − ∑ demi,a,T0,nnϵN(i,a) =
0 ;   ∀i, aϵA(i)       
(4. 61) 
∑ qi,a,t,nnϵN(i,a) + ∑ (xi,a,t,n
+ − xi,a,t,n
− )nϵN(i,a) − ri,a,t + ri,a,(t−1) − ∑ demi,a,t,nnϵN(i,a) −















6      free ;       ∀i, aϵA(i), t ≠ T0  
(4. 64) 
A summary of the complete MIP model for the Stackelberg game problem is shown in 
Table 8. 
Table 8 Summary of one leader multi-follower Stackelberg game- MIP Two-Way model 
Type Hierarchy Description Equation(s) 
Objective Function Leader ISO Objective Function (3. 1) 
Constraints Leader ISO Constraints (3. 2)-(3. 7) 
Follower BGFs Integer Opt. Conditions (4. 31)-(4. 43)  
Follower SDRs Integer Opt. Conditions (4. 44)-(4. 64)  
SOS Model 
Another way to linearize the complementarity constraint of an MPEC is to use SOS1 
variables (Siddiqui and Gabriel, 2013). A specifically ordered set of variables (SOS1), 
is a group of variables of which at most one member can have a nonzero value in the 
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solution. A mixed integer solver is required to solve any model containing SOS1 
variables since the solution process needs to impose mutual exclusively and so it 
implicitly defines an additional set of binary variables. However, the SOS1 variables 
do not have to take on integer solutions. One of the advantages of employing SOS 
technique to complementarity constraints instead of MIP technique is preventing 
unstable solutions in MIP model due to large number of BigMs.  
Using newly defined variables 𝜋 and 𝛿, any complementarity constraint such as (4. 27) 









       
(4. 66) 
𝜋2 = 𝛿2 
(4. 67) 
Since  
0 ≤ 𝑥  , 𝑓(𝑥) ≥ 0          
(4. 68) 
It can be concluded that 
𝜋 = |𝛿| 
(4. 69) 
Moreover, based on theorem mentioned in (Beale, 1975), an absolute value of a 
variable can be written as combination of its positive and negative parts which can be 
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interpreted as special order set variables of type 1 (SOS1). So if 𝛿+ and 𝛿− be SOS1 
variables then the complementarity constraint (4. 27) can be written as; 
𝑓(𝑥) ≥ 0          
(4. 70) 
𝑥 ≥ 0          
(4. 71) 







𝛿+ − 𝛿−  =
𝑥−𝑓(𝑥)
2
       
(4. 74) 
Applying the above mentioned definition to complementarity constraints on the MPEC 
problem in Table 7, an SOS model will be produced. The corresponding SOS model 
can be solved using CPLEX commercial solver. 
Existence of Solution 
Before introducing the developed solution algorithm for the proposed model, it is 
necessary to validate the model and show whether the aforementioned Stackelberg 
game has any feasible solution or not. That is to check whether the game among 
different participants in the lower level has any feasible equilibrium which is also 
feasible in the upper levels’ constraints.  
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In this section solution existence to the Nash-Cournot game among BGFs and SDRs 
shown in Table 7 is discussed. Ralph and Smeers (2006) overviewed application of 
Equilibrium Problems with Equilibrium Constraints (EPEC) in electricity markets and 
brought up non-existence and multiple solution existence in this type of models. Hu 
and Ralph (2007) studied Equilibrium Problems with Equilibrium Constraints (EPEC) 
which are multiple MPECs in bi-level game for restructured electricity market. They 
established sufficient conditions for existence of pure strategy Nash equilibriums for 
these categories of problems and showed the stationary conditions of an EPEC can be 
phrased as a complementarity problem for which solutions are the Nash stationary 
points. However, contrary to general MPECs, there are different theorems and lemmas 
on solution existence for Linear Complementarity Problems (LCP) (Cottle, Pang et al., 
2009). LCP is a special case of MPEC with no equality constraints. These theorems 
will be borrowed in this study to prove the existence of equilibrium.  
Existence of equilibrium for the lower level games does not necessarily guarantee a 
solution to the whole MPEC problem. Even if the feasible region of the lower level is 
non empty and has feasible equilibrium points in it, but still these feasible equilibrium 
sets may not be feasible in the network constraints which are in the upper level problem. 
To deal with this issue, for the sake of proving the existence of solution, network 
constraints are considered in the BGFs and SDRs’ decision problems. This ensures the 
optimality conditions also will consider upper level’s constraints. That means if 
solution exists to this problem, then it is justified to conclude that the main problem 
with upper level constraints also has feasible solution. 
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To transform the MPEC to an LCP, some modifications to the original problems are 
needed. The modifications do not make any changes to the main problem and the model 
still will have the same feasible region and objective function. To convert the MPEC 
model in Table 7 to an LCP model, equality constraints (4. 8), (4. 24), (4. 25), and (4. 
26) should be transformed to inequality constraints which means their corresponding 
constraints in the original model (Table 5), would change. (3. 10) would be   
qgg,t − xgg,t  − rgg,t + rgg,t−1 ≥ 0       ;      ∀gϵG, t  − − εg,t
2−t                                   
(4. 75) 
qgg,t − xgg,t  − rgg,t + rgg,t−1 ≤ 0     ;        ∀gϵG, t  − − εg,t
2+t                                  
(4. 76) 
And (3. 14) would be 
DEMi,a ≤ ∑ ∑ demi,a,t,nnϵN(i,a)t     ;     ∀i, aϵA(i) − − βi,a
1−      
(4. 77) 
∑ ∑ demi,a,t,nnϵN(i,a)t ≤ DEMi,a     ;      ∀i, aϵA(i) − − βi,a
1+  
(4. 78) 
And (3. 18) would be 
∑ qi,a,T0,nnϵN(i,a) + ∑ (xi,a,t,n
+ − xi,a,t,n
− )nϵN(i,a) − ri,a,T0 + R0i,a − ∑ demi,a,T0,nnϵN(i,a) ≥
0    ;   ∀i, aϵA(i)   − − − − βi,a
5−  
(4. 79) 
∑ qi,a,T0,nnϵN(i,a) + ∑ (xi,a,t,n
+ − xi,a,t,n
− )nϵN(i,a) − ri,a,T0 + R0i,a − ∑ demi,a,T0,nnϵN(i,a) ≤





And finally (3. 19) would be 
∑ qi,a,t,nnϵN(i,a) + ∑ (xi,a,t,n
+ − xi,a,t,n
− )nϵN(i,a) − ri,a,t + ri,a,(t−1) − ∑ demi,a,t,nnϵN(i,a) −
CHARi,a,t−1 ≥ 0     ; ∀i, aϵA(i), t ≠ T0   − − − − βi,a,t
6−   
(4. 81) 
∑ qi,a,t,nnϵN(i,a) + ∑ (xi,a,t,n
+ − xi,a,t,n
− )nϵN(i,a) − ri,a,t + ri,a,(t−1) − ∑ demi,a,t,nnϵN(i,a) −
CHARi,a,t−1 ≤ 0     ; ∀i, aϵA(i), t ≠ T0   − − − − βi,a,t
6+   
(4. 82) 
Also network constraints (3. 4) and (3. 5) should be considered in taking the KKT 
conditions. 
∑ ∑ ∑ xi,a,t,nnϵN(i,a)aϵA(i)iϵI − ∑ xgg,tg∈G ≥ 0 ;  ∀t − − − − θt
1− 
(4. 83) 
∑ ∑ ∑ xi,a,t,nnϵN(i,a)aϵA(i)iϵI − ∑ xgg,tg∈G ≤ 0 ;  ∀t − − − − θt
1+ 
(4. 84) 




Kl − ∑ ((∑ ∑ ∑ xi,a,t,nnϵN(i,a)aϵA(i)iϵI − ∑ xgg,tg∈G|GNODEg=nnϵN )Dn,l) ≥ 0 ;  ∀lϵL, t   
− − − − θl,t
3  
(4. 86) 
Substituting the modified constraints in the original model, the model would be still 
linear and convex, and so KKT conditions are both necessary and sufficient. Taking 
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KKTs from the modified model, the Nash-Cournot game among the BGFs and SDRs 
would be in the form of an LCP as follows:   





2 ∑ Dn,l𝑙 −
θl,t
3 ∑ Dn,l𝑙 ⊥ xgg,t ≥ 0   ;     ∀gϵG, t  
(4. 87) 
0 ≤ CGg,t + εg,t
1 − εg,t
2− + εg,t
2+ ⊥ qgg,t ≥ 0   ;     ∀gϵG, t                                             
(4. 88) 
0 ≤ CRGg,t + εg,t+1
2+ (t < T) − εg,t+1
2− (t < T) − εg,t
2+ + εg,t
2− + εg,t
3 ⊥ rgg,t ≥ 0; ∀gϵG, t    
(4. 89) 
0 ≤ QGg − qgg,t ⊥ εg,t
1 ≥ 0      ;        ∀gϵG, t     
(4. 90) 
0 ≤ qgg,t − xgg,t  − rgg,t + rgg,t−1(t > T0)  ⊥ εg,t
2− ≥ 0     ;        ∀gϵG, t    
(4. 91) 
0 ≤ −qgg,t + xgg,t + rgg,t − rgg,t−1(t > T0)  ⊥ εg,t
2+ ≥ 0          ;        ∀gϵG, t   
(4. 92) 
0 ≤ RGg − rgg,t ⊥ εg,t
3 ≥ 0      ;        ∀gϵG, t   
(4. 93) 
0 ≤ ∑ ∑ ∑ xi,a,t,nnϵN(i,a)aϵA(i)iϵI − ∑ xgg,tg∈G ⊥ θt
1− ≥ 0  
(4. 94) 
0 ≤ −∑ ∑ ∑ xi,a,t,nnϵN(i,a)aϵA(i)iϵI + ∑ xgg,tg∈G ⊥ θt




0 ≤ ∑ ((∑ ∑ ∑ xi,a,t,nnϵN(i,a)aϵA(i)iϵI − ∑ xgg,tg∈G|GNODEg=nnϵN )Dn,l)+Kl ⊥ θl,t
2 ≥ 0  
(4. 96) 
0 ≤ −∑ ((∑ ∑ ∑ xi,a,t,nnϵN(i,a)aϵA(i)iϵI − ∑ xgg,tg∈G|GNODEg=nnϵN )Dn,l)+Kl ⊥ θl,t
3 ≥ 0  
(4. 97) 
0 ≤ Z − W ∑ xg
g,tgϵG
+ βi,a
5+〈t = T0〉 − βi,a
5−〈t = T0〉 + βi,a,t
6+ 〈t ≠ T0〉 − βi,a,t




2 ∑ Dn,l𝑙 + θl,t
3 ∑ Dn,l𝑙 ⊥ xpi,a,t,n ≥ 0; ∀i, aϵA(i), n, t  
(4. 98) 
0 ≤ −Z + W ∑ xg
g,tgϵG
− βi,a
5+〈t = T0〉 + βi,a
5−〈t = T0〉 − βi,a,t
6+ 〈t ≠ T0〉 + βi,a,t




2 ∑ Dn,l𝑙 − θl,t
3 ∑ Dn,l𝑙 ⊥ xni,a,t,n ≥ 0; ∀i, aϵA(i), n, t  
(4. 99) 




5−)〈t = T0〉 − (βi,a,t
6+ − βi,a,t
6− )〈t ≠ T0〉  ⊥
demi,a,t,n ≥  0 ;     ∀i, aϵA(i), n, t    
(4. 100) 
0 ≤ Ci,a,t,n + βi,a
3 + (βi,a
5+ − βi,a
5−)〈t = T0〉 + (βi,a,t
6+ − βi,a,t
6− )〈t ≠ T0〉  ⊥ qi,a,t,n ≥
 0 ;     ∀i, aϵA(i), n, t     
(4. 101) 




5−)〈t = T0〉 + (βi,a,(t+1)
6+ − βi,a,(t+1)
6− )〈t = T0〉 −
(βi,a,t
6+ − βi,a,t
6− )〈t ≠ T0〉 + (βi,a,(t+1)
6+ − βi,a,(t+1)
6− )〈t ≠ T0〉  ⊥ ri,at ≥  0 ;    ∀i, aϵA(i), t       
(4. 102) 
0 ≤ ri,a,t − CHARi,a,t ⊥ βi,a,t




0 ≤ Qi,a − ∑ qi,a,t,nnϵN(i,a) ⊥ βi,a,t
3 ≥ 0      ;        ∀i, aϵA(i), t       
(4. 104) 
0 ≤ RCAPi,a − ri,a,t ⊥ βi,a,t
4 ≥ 0       ;        ∀i, aϵA(i), t         
(4. 105) 
0 ≤ ∑ ∑ demi,a,t,nnϵN(i,a)t − DEMi,a ⊥ βi,a
1− ≥ 0       ;        ∀i, aϵA(i)          
(4. 106) 
0 ≤ DEMi,a − ∑ ∑ demi,a,t,nnϵN(i,a)t ⊥ βi,a
1+ ≥ 0       ;        ∀i, aϵA(i)       
(4. 107) 
0 ≤ ∑ qi,a,T0,nnϵN(i,a) + ∑ (xpi,a,T0,nnϵN(i,a) − xni,a,T0,n) − ri,a,T0 + R0i,a −
∑ demi,a,T0,nnϵN(i,a) ⊥ βia
5− ≥ 0    ;   ∀i, aϵA(i)       
(4. 108) 
0 ≤ −∑ qi,a,T0,nnϵN(i,a) − ∑ (xpi,a,T0,nnϵN(i,a) − xni,a,T0,n) + ri,a,T0 − R0i,a +
∑ demi,a,T0,nnϵN(i,a) ⊥ βia
5+ ≥ 0    ;   ∀i, aϵA(i)       
(4. 109) 
0 ≤ ∑ qi,a,t,nnϵN(i,a) + ∑ (xpi,a,t,nnϵN(i,a) − xni,a,t,n) − ri,a,t + ri,a,(t−1) −
∑ demi,a,t,nnϵN(i,a) − CHARi,a,t−1 ⊥ βi,a,t
6− ≥ 0; ∀i, aϵA(i), t ≠ T0    
(4. 110) 
0 ≤ −∑ qi,a,t,nnϵN(i,a) − ∑ (xpi,a,t,nnϵN(i,a) − xni,a,t,n) + ri,a,t − ri,a,(t−1) +
∑ demi,a,t,nnϵN(i,a) + CHARi,a,t−1 ⊥ βi,a,t




Now that the model is in LCP format, it is possible to continue with the proof of 
existence. Assume 









Then the modified Stackelberg model (4. 87)-(4. 111) could be written as 𝐿𝐶𝑃∗(𝑞,𝑀) 
when: 
𝑧1








3 ]  
𝑧2
𝑇 =



































∑ ∑ ∑ xi,a,t,nnϵN(i,a)aϵA(i)iϵI
−∑ ∑ ∑ xi,a,t,nnϵN(i,a)aϵA(i)iϵI
∑ (Dn,l ∑ ∑ ∑ xi,a,t,nnϵN(i,a)aϵA(i)iϵInϵN )+Kl























































−∑ Dn,l ∑ xgg,tg∈G|GNODEg=nnϵN +Kl








































2𝑊; 𝑔′ = 𝑔
𝑊;𝑔′ ≠ 𝑔
} 0 0 00 1 −1 1−1Dn,l−Dn,l
0 0 0 10 −1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 01{
1; 𝑔′ = 𝑔
−1; 𝑡′ = 𝑡 + 1|𝑡 < 𝑇
}{
−1; 𝑔′ = 𝑔
1; 𝑡′ = 𝑡 + 1|𝑡 < 𝑇
}0 0 0 0
0 −1 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 −1 00 0 0 0 0 0 0
−1 1 {
−1; 𝑔′ = 𝑔
1; 𝑡′ = 𝑡 − 1|𝑡 > T0
} 00 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 −1{
1; 𝑔′ = 𝑔
−1; 𝑡′ = 𝑡 − 1|𝑡 > T0
}00 0 0 0 0 0 0
−1 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0
−Dn,l 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0











































0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 −1 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 {
−1; 𝑡 = T0
0; 𝑡 ≠ T0
} {
1; 𝑡 = T0
0; 𝑡 ≠ T0
} {
−1; 𝑡 = T0
0; 𝑡 ≠ T0
} 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 {
1; 𝑡 = T0
0; 𝑡 ≠ T0
} {
−1; 𝑡 = T0
0; 𝑡 ≠ T0
} {
1; 𝑡 = T0
0; 𝑡 ≠ T0
} 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 {
0; 𝑡 = T0
−1; 𝑡 ≠ T0
} {
0; 𝑡 = T0
1; 𝑡 ≠ T0
} {
−1; 𝑡 = t, t ≠ T0
1; 𝑡 = t − 1
} 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 {
0; 𝑡 = T0
1; 𝑡 ≠ T0
} {
0; 𝑡 = T0
−1; 𝑡 ≠ T0
} {
1; 𝑡 = t, t ≠ T0
−1; 𝑡 = t − 1
} 0 0 0 0 0
1 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
−1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dn,l −Dn,l 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
−Dn,l Dn,l 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
  
0 0 0 0 −1 1 −Dn,l Dn,l
0 0 0 0 1 −1 Dn,l −Dn,l
{
1; 𝑡 = T0
0; 𝑡 ≠ T0
} {
−1; 𝑡 = T0
0; 𝑡 ≠ T0
} {
0; 𝑡 = T0
1; 𝑡 ≠ T0
} {
0; 𝑡 = T0
−1; 𝑡 ≠ T0
} 0 0 0 0
{
−1; 𝑡 = T0
0; 𝑡 ≠ T0
} {
1; 𝑡 = T0
0; 𝑡 ≠ T0
} {
0; 𝑡 = T0
−1; 𝑡 ≠ T0
} {
0; 𝑡 = T0
1; 𝑡 ≠ T0
} 0 0 0 0
{
1; 𝑡 = T0
0; 𝑡 ≠ T0
} {
−1; 𝑡 = T0
0; 𝑡 ≠ T0
} {
−1; 𝑡 = t + 1
1; 𝑡 = t, 𝑡 ≠ T0
} {
1; 𝑡 = t + 1
−1; 𝑡 = t, 𝑡 ≠ T0
} 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0























Cottle and Pang (2009) define a matrix 𝑀 ∈ 𝑅𝑛×𝑛 to be: 




b. Strictly copositive if 𝑦𝑇𝑀𝑦 > 0 for all  nonzero 𝑦 ∈ 𝑅+
𝑛 
c. Copositive-plus if M is copositive and the following implication holds: 
[𝑦𝑇𝑀𝑦 = 0, 𝑦 ≥ 0] ⟹ [(𝑀 + 𝑀𝑇)𝑦 = 0] 
d. Copositive-star if M is copositive and the following implication holds: 
[𝑦𝑇𝑀𝑦 = 0,𝑀𝑦 ≥ 0, 𝑦 ≥ 0] ⟹ [𝑀𝑇𝑦 ≤ 0] 
They showed if 𝑀 ∈ 𝑅𝑛×𝑛 is strictly copositive, then for each 𝑞 ∈ 𝑅𝑛, the 𝐿𝐶𝑃(𝑞,𝑀) 
has a solution. And if 𝑀 ∈ 𝑅𝑛×𝑛 is copositive star, then the following statements would 
be equivalent: 
a. M is an S-matrix (Stiemke Matrix) (𝐿𝐶𝑃(𝑞,𝑀) is feasible for all choices of q)  
b. M is a Q-matrix (𝐿𝐶𝑃(𝑞,𝑀) is solvable for all choices of q). 
Using these theorems and the defined 𝐿𝐶𝑃∗(𝑞,𝑀), solution existence is proved as 
follows. 
Proposition 1 
𝐿𝐶𝑃∗(𝑞,𝑀) has a solution and is feasible and solvable for all choices of q. 
Proof: 
If 𝑦1 ∈ 𝑅+
11∗|𝐺|
, 𝑦2 ∈ 𝑅+
18 , and 𝑦 = [𝑦1 𝑦2] ∈ 𝑅+
𝑛: 
𝑦𝑇𝑀𝑦 = 𝑦𝑇 (
𝑀1 0
0 𝑀2
) 𝑦 = 𝑦1
𝑇𝑀1𝑦1 + 𝑦2
𝑇𝑀2𝑦2     
(P. 1) 
If two parts are separated then it is easy to show 
𝑦1
𝑇𝑀1𝑦1 = 2𝑊 ∑ 𝑦1
1𝑔2




      
(P. 2) 




𝑦1 > 0 
𝑊 > 0
}                 
(P. 3) 
(P. 2) & (P. 3) ⟹ 𝑦1
𝑇𝑀1𝑦1 > 0         
(P. 4) 






}            
(P. 5) 
⟹ 𝑦1 = 0 ⟹ 𝑀1
𝑇𝑦1 ≤ 0              
(P. 6) 
On the other side, since 𝑀2 is a skew-symmetric matrix for any 𝑦2, it is clear that 
𝑦2




𝑇 = 0 ⟹ (𝑀2 + 𝑀2
𝑇)𝑦2 = 0            
(P. 8) 






}     
(P. 9) 




It can be concluded that 𝑀2
𝑇𝑦2 ≤ 0 should always be true. So if 𝑦 > 0, it can be 
concluded that 






} ⟹ 𝑦𝑇𝑀𝑦 > 0    
(P. 10) 
Based on (Cottle, Pang et al., 2009) and (P. 10), 𝑀 is strictly copositive, and so for each 
𝑞 ∈ 𝑅𝑛, 𝐿𝐶𝑃∗(𝑞,𝑀) has a solution. 
Moreover, if  
𝑦𝑇𝑀𝑦 = 0 ⟹ 𝑦1
𝑇𝑀1𝑦1 + 𝑦2
𝑇𝑀2𝑦2 = 0                 
(P. 11) 
but given (P. 7) it is concluded that 
𝑦2
𝑇𝑀2𝑦2 = 0 ⟹ 𝑦1
𝑇𝑀1𝑦1 = 0         
(P. 12) 
Given  
𝑊 > 0 ⟹ 𝑦1 = 0                 
(P. 13) 
As a result if  {
𝑀𝑦 ≥ 0
𝑦 ≥ 0
} then                          
⟹ 𝑀1𝑦1 + 𝑀2𝑦2 ≥ 0                
(P. 14) 
However, from (P. 13) it is known that 




Since 𝑀2 is a skew-symmetric matrix so  
⟹ 𝑀2𝑦2 ≥ 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑀2 = −𝑀2
𝑇 ⟹ 𝑀2
𝑇𝑦2 ≤ 0 ⟹ 𝑀𝑦 ≤ 0      
(P. 16) 
So 𝑀 is copositive star which means M is both S and Q-matrix, and so 𝐿𝐶𝑃∗(𝑞,𝑀) is 
feasible and solvable for all choices of q. □ 
Proposition 2 
The MPEC Stackelberg game defined in Table 7 has at least a solution if feasible region 
is non-empty. 
Proof:  
In the MPEC model, ISO as the leader decides on the amount of trades 
(imports/exports) in the network. Different decisions of ISO affect the lower level 
𝐿𝐶𝑃∗(𝑞,𝑀) by varying 𝑞 vector. According to Proposition 1, 𝐿𝐶𝑃∗(𝑞,𝑀) is feasible 
and solvable for all choices of 𝑞 and has at least a solution.  
Since network constraints are added to the LCP of the lower level decision problems, 
it is shown that there is always at least one feasible equilibrium solution for every 
decision made by ISO which is also feasible in the ISO’s constraints. So if ISO’s 
constraints make a feasible region itself, then it definitely has a common area with 
feasible region of the lower level game, and so the MPEC would at least have one 
optimal solution for the linear objective function of the ISO. □ 
Despite proving existence of solution to general proposed MPEC, there is still an issue 
of having multiple solutions for the problem. Although 𝐿𝐶𝑃∗(𝑞,𝑀) has a feasible 
solution for all q, the solution might not be unique and there might be multi-equilibria 
for the game. Studies are available on finding all equilibria in a game (Cottle, Pang et 
 
 84 
al., 2009, Day, Hobbs et al., 2002, Leyffer and Munson, 2010). However, existence of 
multiple solutions for the lower level game is a benefit for the model since it extends 
the feasible region for ISO. Choosing the right market equilibrium in case of multiple 
equilibriums in the Stackelberg model will be a major concern as this issue has been 
raised in some studies (Neuhoff, Barquin et al., 2005). However, the author believes 
this can be a plus to the model since at any time the operator can choose the best 
solution among multiple solutions based on the situation.  
Solution Algorithm 
Two main challenges are on the table solving the proposed Stackelberg model. First is 
the huge size of variables in real cases which increases dramatically with increase in 
the number of users and appliances and changes in network topology. This gets worse 
considering the dynamic nature of the problem. The problem is being solved in a rolling 
horizon manner and so should be solved in a matter of minutes in real cases. Second is 
the special shape of the feasible region. Heuristics are basically developed based on 
finding an initial feasible solution and then improving it. However, if the feasible region 
is small and has a special shape, then heuristics mostly behave weakly in finding the 
initial feasible point to start with. Considering the size and dynamic nature of the 
problem, the MPEC and the converted MIP model are both very complex and time 
consuming to solve. To overcome these mentioned challenges there is a need for 
developing a new algorithm to benefit from the special structure of the problem.  
Bi-level programming problems are mathematical optimization modeling in which 
decision variables are divided into two sets and one of them being determined 
parametrically based on the other set. Although using bi-level programming is very 
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useful and realistic in many real world problems, generally solving them is very 
complex and difficult. The complexity is even more sensible when the size of the 
problem increases. Complexity of the models and solution approaches mainly are 
dependent on how decision variables are divided between different levels of the model 
and how all of them are related to each other. Consequently, how to model a bi-level 
problem and benefiting from special structure of the model are the main keys toward 
solving them. 
Previously, it was shown that the lower level optimization model is guaranteed to have 
at least one feasible solution for any solution of the upper level decision problem. This 
is one of the key bases on which to build the algorithm. In the first stage of the 
algorithm, ISO’s decision problem is solved including all lower level constraints. Then 
total trades at each time and flow levels on lines are fixed. The fixed amounts are 
dictated as constants to all other participants in the system in the second stage. There 
are two main games in the lower level. One is among BGFs and the other is among 
SDRs. In the BGF’s game, SDRs’ trade values are set based on the ISO’s solution. 
Then the algorithm solves BGF’s problem for their best decisions through maximizing 
sum of their objectives in stage 2 while including ISO’s constraints. BGFs decisions 
from stage 2 are then fixed and fed into the SDRs decision problem. In stage 3, each 
user’s best action in the game assuming fixed BGFs’ variables, total trades at each time 
and lines’ flows is found through maximizing total sum of SDRs’ objectives. To ensure 
feasibility of solutions for ISO’s problem, ISO’s constraints are included in stage 3. 
Moreover, to eliminate some of the bad solutions a cut is added based on the best bound 
of the solution. Finally, in stage 4, ISO’s problem is resolved assuming all the lower 
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level variables are fixed to search for the best possible solution and objective value. 
The flowchart of the developed algorithm and the algorithm itself are shown in Figure 
10 and Table 9. 
 
Figure 10 Flowchart for the solution algorithm for the Two-Way model 
Benefiting from the special structure of the model and the assumptions, it can be shown 
the solution of the proposed algorithm is a feasible solution to the proposed Stackelberg 
model. Assume the following: 
Case 1: is the MPEC shown in Table 7 with BGFs’ and SDRs’ KKT conditions 






∗ respectively.  
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Case 2: is the algorithm proposed for solving the Stackelberg game in Case 1 and 







Finally, assume solution set of 𝑥2, 𝑥𝑔2
, 𝐼𝑆𝑂2, 𝐵𝐺𝐹2, 𝑆𝐷𝑅2 is reached in the first stage 
of Case 2. In stage 2, sum of 𝑥2 in (3. 4) and (3. 5) is fixed and then BGFs decision 
problem is solved for 𝑀𝑎𝑥.∑ 𝐵𝐺𝐹𝑔𝑔  to find  𝑥𝑔2
∗ , 𝑞𝑔2
∗ , and 𝑟𝑔2
∗ .  
Table 9 Summary of the solution algorithm for the Two-Way model 
 
Proposition 3 
Stage Input Equation(s) 
1  Solve  
Min. ∑ ∑ Pn,t. (∑ xgg,t(gϵG|gnode(g) = n)  − 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑛,𝑡n∈Nt )  
s.t.: (3. 2)-(3. 7) & (3. 9)-(3. 12) & (3. 14) -(3. 21) 
2 x̅i,a,t,n Solve  
Max. ∑ ∑ ((Z − W∑ xggg,tggϵG )xgg,t − CGg,t. qgg,t − CRGg,t. rgg,t)t𝑔ϵG   
s.t.: (3. 4)-(3. 5) & (3. 9)-(3. 12) 
3 xg̅̅ ̅g,t, 
expo̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑛,𝑡 
Solve  
Max. ∑ ∑ (∑ ∑ (Vi,a,t,n. demi,a,t,nnϵN(i,a)aϵA(i)t − Ci,a,t,n. qi,a,t,n − (Z −𝑖ϵI
W ∑ xgg,tgϵG ). xi,a,n,t) + ∑ (VCHARi,a,t. CHARi,a,t − CRi,a,t. ri,a,taϵA(i) ))   
s.t.: expo̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑛,𝑡 ≤ ∑ ∑ x𝑖,𝑎,𝑡,𝑛aϵA(i)i∈I    
& (3. 4)-(3. 5) & (3. 14) -(3. 21) 
4 x̅i,a,t,n, xg̅̅ ̅g,t Solve 
Min. ∑ ∑ Pn,t. (∑ xg̅̅ ̅g,t(gϵG|gnode(g) = n)  − 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑛,𝑡n∈Nt )  
s.t.: 






∗ , and ∑ 𝐵𝐺𝐹2
∗
𝑔  in Case 2 is an equilibrium set for the BGFs’ game 
in Case1. 
Proof: (Proof by contradiction) 
Assume to the contrary that the solution set is not an equilibrium in Case 1. That is 
having all players’ with the same decisions; one player has a better move to play. Its 




i. If it is due to a different value of 𝑞𝑔2
 and 𝑟𝑔2
 , then new set of decisions for the player 
does not affect other decision makers’ decision. Since its new decision does not have 
influence over other players’ objective. This means there should be a better objective 
value for that player using the new set of 𝑞𝑔2
 and 𝑟𝑔2
. According to Bellman’s principle 
of optimality, this results in a better total ∑ 𝐵𝐺𝐹𝑔𝑔 . However, it was assumed that 
∑ 𝐵𝐺𝐹2
∗
𝑔  is maximized and no better solution should exist. So this is contradictory to 
the assumption.  
ii. If it is due to different value of 𝑥𝑔2
, then in order to comply with constant sum of 𝑥𝑔2
 
in constraints (3. 4) and (3. 5), other players should also change their strategy which is 
a contradiction as well. 




∗ , and 𝑟𝑔2
∗  is an equilibrium to the BGF’s game in 
Case1. □ 
It can also be shown in the same approach that solution of stage 3 in Case 2 is an 
equilibrium in the SDR’s game in Case 1.  
Proposition 4 




In Case 2, the equilibrium in the lower level games are found upon a fixed constant fed 
into (3. 4) and (3. 5) in each game. This fixed constant is set by ISO, while in Case 1, 
for each set of equilibrium in the lower level there is a fixed constant for the (3. 4) and 
(3. 5) constraints. ISO is optimizing its objective over these feasible equilibrium sets. 
In stage 1 of Case 2, the best constant for (3. 4) and (3. 5) constraints for ISO’s decision 
problem is found. Although this constant remains the same for the final equilibrium 
sets in stage 4, but export variable would change and so objective value will change. 
However, this value will never be better than the stage 1’s objective value. So the 
objective in stage 1 can be used as the lower bound for the problem. □ 
One-Way model 
Existence of Solution 
Solution existence for the One-Way model can be proved in the same way as the Two-
Way model. The only difference is that while xi,a,t,n and xgg,t are variables in the lower 
level of the Two-Way model, they are not in the lower level of the One-Way model. 
So as will be shown, there is no need to consider the upper level constraints in the lower 
level game to prove the solution existence. After modifying the equilibrium constraints 
of the One-Way problem in Table 6, and taking the KKT of the modified model, the 
LCP of the One-Way problem would be as follows:  
0 ≤ CGg,t + εg,t
1 − εg,t
2− + εg,t
2+ ⊥ qgg,t ≥ 0   ;     ∀gϵG, t                                             
(4. 112) 
0 ≤ CRGg,t + εg,t+1
2+ (t < T) − εg,t+1
2− (t < T) − εg,t
2+ + εg,t
2− + εg,t




0 ≤ QGg − qgg,t ⊥ εg,t
1 ≥ 0      ;        ∀gϵG, t     
(4. 114) 
0 ≤ qgg,t − xgg,t  − rgg,t + rgg,t−1(t > T0)  ⊥ εg,t
2− ≥ 0     ;        ∀gϵG, t    
(4. 115) 
0 ≤ −qgg,t + xgg,t + rgg,t − rgg,t−1(t > T0)  ⊥ εg,t
2+ ≥ 0          ;        ∀gϵG, t   
(4. 116) 
0 ≤ RGg − rgg,t ⊥ εg,t
3 ≥ 0      ;        ∀gϵG, t   
(4. 117) 




5−)〈t = T0〉 − (βi,a,t
6+ − βi,a,t
6− )〈t ≠ T0〉  ⊥
demi,a,t,n ≥  0 ;     ∀i, aϵA(i), n, t    
(4. 118) 
0 ≤ Ci,a,t,n + βi,a
3 + (βi,a
5+ − βi,a
5−)〈t = T0〉 + (βi,a,t
6+ − βi,a,t
6− )〈t ≠ T0〉  ⊥ qi,a,t,n ≥
 0 ;     ∀i, aϵA(i), n, t     
(4. 119) 




5−)〈t = T0〉 + (βi,a,(t+1)
6+ − βi,a,(t+1)
6− )〈t = T0〉 −
(βi,a,t
6+ − βi,a,t
6− )〈t ≠ T0〉 + (βi,a,(t+1)
6+ − βi,a,(t+1)
6− )〈t ≠ T0〉  ⊥ ri,at ≥  0 ;    ∀i, aϵA(i), t       
(4. 120) 
0 ≤ ri,a,t − CHARi,a,t ⊥ βi,a,t
2 ≥ 0       ;        ∀i, aϵA(i), t       
(4. 121) 
0 ≤ Qi,a − ∑ qi,a,t,nnϵN(i,a) ⊥ βi,a,t




0 ≤ RCAPi,a − ri,a,t ⊥ βi,a,t
4 ≥ 0       ;        ∀i, aϵA(i), t         
(4. 123) 
0 ≤ ∑ ∑ demi,a,t,nnϵN(i,a)t − DEMi,a ⊥ βi,a
1− ≥ 0       ;        ∀i, aϵA(i)          
(4. 124) 
0 ≤ DEMi,a − ∑ ∑ demi,a,t,nnϵN(i,a)t ⊥ βi,a
1+ ≥ 0       ;        ∀i, aϵA(i)       
(4. 125) 
0 ≤ ∑ qi,a,T0,nnϵN(i,a) + ∑ xi,a,T0,nnϵN(i,a) − ri,a,T0 + R0i,a − ∑ demi,a,T0,nnϵN(i,a) ⊥
βia
5− ≥ 0    ;   ∀i, aϵA(i)       
(4. 126) 
0 ≤ −∑ qi,a,T0,nnϵN(i,a) − ∑ xi,a,T0,nnϵN(i,a) + ri,a,T0 − R0i,a + ∑ demi,a,T0,nnϵN(i,a) ⊥
βia
5+ ≥ 0    ;   ∀i, aϵA(i)       
(4. 127) 
0 ≤ ∑ qi,a,t,nnϵN(i,a) + ∑ xi,a,t,nnϵN(i,a) − ri,a,t + ri,a,(t−1) − ∑ demi,a,t,nnϵN(i,a) −
CHARi,a,t−1 ⊥ βi,a,t
6− ≥ 0; ∀i, aϵA(i), t ≠ T0    
(4. 128) 
0 ≤ −∑ qi,a,t,nnϵN(i,a) − ∑ xi,a,t,nnϵN(i,a) + ri,a,t − ri,a,(t−1) + ∑ demi,a,t,nnϵN(i,a) +
CHARi,a,t−1 ⊥ βi,a,t
6+ ≥ 0 ; ∀i, aϵA(i), t ≠ T0       
(4. 129) 
Assume 











Then the modified One-Way Stackelberg model (4. 112)-(4. 129) could be written as 
𝐿𝐶𝑃∗(𝑞,𝑀) when:  
𝑧1




























































∑ xi,a,T0,nnϵN(i,a) + R0i,a
−∑ xi,a,T0,nnϵN(i,a) − R0i,a
∑ xi,a,t,nnϵN(i,a) − CHARi,a,t−1

























0 0 10 −1 1
0 0 01{
1; 𝑔′ = 𝑔
−1; 𝑡′ = 𝑡 + 1|𝑡 < 𝑇
}{
−1; 𝑔′ = 𝑔
1; 𝑡′ = 𝑡 + 1|𝑡 < 𝑇
}
−1 0 00 0 0
0 −1 00 0 0
1 {
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𝐿𝐶𝑃∗(𝑞,𝑀) has a solution and is feasible and solvable for all choices of q. 
Proof: 
If 𝑦1 ∈ 𝑅+
6∗|𝐺|
, 𝑦2 ∈ 𝑅+
12 , and 𝑦 = [𝑦1 𝑦2] ∈ 𝑅+
𝑛: 
𝑦𝑇𝑀𝑦 = 𝑦𝑇 (
𝑀1 0
0 𝑀2
) 𝑦 = 𝑦1
𝑇𝑀1𝑦1 + 𝑦2
𝑇𝑀2𝑦2     
(P. 17) 




𝑇𝑀1𝑦1 = 0                 
(P. 18) 
𝑦2




𝑇 = 0 ⟹ (𝑀1 + 𝑀1
𝑇)𝑦1 = 0            
(P. 20) 
𝑀2 + 𝑀2
𝑇 = 0 ⟹ (𝑀2 + 𝑀2
𝑇)𝑦2 = 0            
(P. 21) 













}     
(P. 23) 
Considering 𝑀1 = −𝑀1
𝑇 and 𝑀2 = −𝑀2
𝑇  
It can be concluded that 𝑀1
𝑇𝑦1 ≤ 0 and 𝑀2
𝑇𝑦2 ≤ 0 should always be true. So if 𝑦 > 0, 
it can be concluded that 










Based on (Cottle, Pang et al., 2009) and (P. 24), 𝑀 is copositive. 
Moreover, if  
𝑦𝑇𝑀𝑦 = 0 ⟹ 𝑦1
𝑇𝑀1𝑦1 + 𝑦2
𝑇𝑀2𝑦2 = 0                 
(P. 25) 
given (P. 22)&(P. 23) it is known that 
𝑦2
𝑇𝑀2𝑦2 = 0  & 𝑦1
𝑇𝑀1𝑦1 = 0         
(P. 26) 
Since 𝑀1 and 𝑀2 are skew-symmetric matrices so  
⟹ 𝑖𝑓 𝑀1𝑦1 ≥ 0 & 𝑦1 ≥ 0 | 𝑀1 = −𝑀1
𝑇 ⟹ 𝑀1
𝑇𝑦1 ≤ 0 
(P. 27) 
⟹ 𝑖𝑓 𝑀2𝑦2 ≥ 0 & 𝑦2 ≥ 0 | 𝑀2 = −𝑀2
𝑇 ⟹ 𝑀2
𝑇𝑦2 ≤ 0      
(P. 28) 
⟹ 𝑦𝑇𝑀𝑦 = 0,𝑀𝑦 ≥ 0, 𝑦 ≥ 0 ⟹ 𝑀𝑇𝑦 ≤ 0 
(P. 29) 
Based on (Cottle, Pang et al., 2009) and (P. 29), 𝑀 is copositive star which means M is 
both S and Q-matrix, and so 𝐿𝐶𝑃∗(𝑞,𝑀) is feasible and solvable for all choices of q. □ 
Proposition 6 
The One-Way model has at least a solution if the feasible region is non-empty. 
Proof:  
In the MPEC model, ISO as the leader decides on the amount of trades 
(imports/exports) in the network. Different decisions of ISO affect the lower level 
𝐿𝐶𝑃∗(𝑞,𝑀) by varying 𝑞 vector. According to Proposition 5, 𝐿𝐶𝑃∗(𝑞,𝑀) is feasible 
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and solvable for all choices of 𝑞 and has at least a solution. So if ISO’s constraints 
make a feasible region which has a common area with feasible region of the lower level 
game, the MPEC would at least have one optimal solution from the linear objective 
function of the ISO. □ 
Solution Algorithm 
As proved in previous section the One-Way 𝐿𝐶𝑃∗(𝑞,𝑀) is feasible and solvable for all 
choices of q. That means for all decisions of ISO, lower level problem has at least a 
feasible solution. Relying on this fact, the algorithm for solving the One-Way model is 
designed as described here. 
The algorithm for solving the One-Way model has the same base as of the algorithm 
for the Two-Way model with few changes. For the One-Way algorithm, in stage 1, 
trade values are all fixed and fed into next stages. Then in stages 2 and 3, instead of 
having game among participants, a decision problem is solved through an optimization. 
Since trade values are fixed in stage 1, and ISO’s variables wouldn’t change in the 





Figure 11 Flowchart for the solution algorithm for the One-Way model 
Benefiting from special structure of the model and the assumptions, it can be shown 
the solution of the proposed algorithm is an optimal solution to the original One-Way 
model in Table 6. Assume the following: 
Case 1: is an MPEC depicted in Table 6 with ISO’s decision problem in the upper level 
and BGFs’ and SDRs’ KKT conditions included as the ISO’s constraints. The set of 






The feasible region for Case 1 is 𝑓(𝐵𝐺𝐹𝑒𝑞𝑢. (𝑥𝑔1
) , 𝑆𝐷𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢. (𝑥1, 𝑥𝑔1
)), while the 
feasible region of the lower level is continuous over the upper levels’ variables based 
on what was discussed in the solution existence. 
Case 2: is the algorithm shown in Figure 11. Set of optimal solutions and objectives for 





∗. The feasible region for Case 2 is 
shown by 𝜒 and the set of all equilibriums for the lower level is Γ(𝜒). 
Proposition 7 




Since decision variables of ISO are not variables in the lower level, ISO has hierarchy 
over BGFs and SDRs. Also some decision variables of the BGFs are not variables in 
SDRs’ problem, which results in a hidden hierarchy of BGFs over SDRs. Case 1’s 
feasible region is a subset of lower level’s feasible equilibriums. On the other hand, 
Case 2’s feasible region is larger compared to Case 1 and BGFs and SDRs feasible 
region is getting more restricted by setting the decisions from the upper level to fix 
values. So the feasible region of the lower level problem in Case 2 is a subset of the 
feasible region of the lower level in Case 1.  
Now to the contrary assume 𝐼𝑆𝑂1
∗  ≠  𝐼𝑆𝑂2
∗ , then: 
As mentioned earlier: ∀𝑥2
∗, 𝑥𝑔2
∗ ∈ 𝜒: Γ(𝜒) ≠ ∅  
Solving the lower level problems for optimality the results would be: 
(𝐵𝐺𝐹𝑒𝑞𝑢. (𝑥𝑔2
∗) , 𝑆𝐷𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢. (𝑥2
∗, 𝑥𝑔2
∗)) ∈ Γ(𝜒) 
Moreover: 𝑓(𝐵𝐺𝐹𝑒𝑞𝑢. (𝑥𝑔2




) , 𝑆𝐷𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢. (𝑥1, 𝑥𝑔1
)) 

































∗)  ∈ 𝜒|𝐼𝑆𝑂1
∗ > 𝐼𝑆𝑂2
∗ ⇒ 𝐼𝑆𝑂2
∗ 𝑖𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙 ⊗ 
“a” and “b” are contradictions. So “c” should be true and so 𝐼𝑆𝑂2
∗ = 𝐼𝑆𝑂1
∗. □ 
As shown in the proof, the objective value of the proposed algorithm and the main 
MPEC problem have to be the same. However, this may not be true for the solution 


















Chapter 5:  Results 
To evaluate the proposed model and compare different solution methodologies with the 
proposed solution algorithm, several examples are designed and solved. Results are 
compared and presented in this chapter. Sensitivity analysis is then conducted on the 
exogenous parameters. Finally conclusions and recommendations are made based on 
the results.  
Data Generation 
To evaluate the model it is best to apply the model and solution algorithm on real world 
systems with real data. However, due to confidentiality and security concerns finding 
a complete network system with its real data is almost impossible. As a result, here 
network and demand data is generated randomly in MATLAB based on real data found 
from open sources. Then different scenarios on several electricity networks with 
different characteristics defined to evaluate the model. 
Network data is borrowed from IEEE distribution test feeders5. Different networks with 
different sizes are used in generating examples. PTDF matrix for each network is 
calculated based on method explained in (Benjamin, 2012). To calculate the PTDF 
matrix for each case, networks are assumed to be built from one phase lines. That means 
the largest impedance is taken for the ones with more than one phase. Also, networks 
are assumed to be DC lossless and so R is set to be zero for all lines. Moreover, node 




one in all networks is taken as the reference node and level of consumption is assumed 
to be the same among all nodes while generating PTDF matrices. 
SDRs in the system are divided into four categories: commercial and building, 
residential, industrial with shifts and industrial with no shift users. Percentage of each 
category among users is shown in Table 10. The hourly demand distribution is 
estimated based on PJM dataset6 in May 2011. Since the provided data is for the whole 
PJM territory with a population of about 61 million7, the distribution is adjusted 
according to the size of each designed problem. The hourly distribution demand 
function is used for generating request times of demands for the users. For demand 
amounts, each appliance of users is assigned a random demand according to their 
category and their share of demand distribution in Table 10.  For large user categories, 
industrials and commercials, some constant and uninterrupted demand is generated to 
cover the minimum demand they have for utilities in 24 hours. Each constant demand 
is set as a new appliance with an inflexible request time during the day. Two of these 
constant demands are assumed to be flexible and 1/3 of them could be shifted to other 
time spots as two appliances, which means these categories each have 26 appliances. 
The maximum number of registered appliances for the residential users is assumed to 
be 5. Appliances could connect to grid at different random nodes and time periods upon 
availability of SDRs. 





Covering demands for electrical vehicles is one of the highlights of this model. It is 
assumed that 40% of the residential users have EV and their demand is generated based 
on EV hourly charging demand distribution function published by ECOtality8 (a DOE 
Project). Electrical vehicles are taken to be an appliance with a battery capacity of 4-
10 (kWh)9. 
Table 10 Percentage of Different Demand Category10 
 
Nodal fees and rewards function is estimated based on price distribution provided by 
BGE for May of 2011 to comply with the time span used for demand distribution11. 
Prices are generated randomly and then smoothed to reduce the peaks and downs. 
The utility function for satisfying demands is assumed to be Gaussian with its 
maximum at the request time of the demand (5. 1). As the time of meeting demand 
diverges from the requested time, the value of satisfying demand is decreasing.  





Where “a” and “b” are randomly generated constants. 
                                                 
8 http://www.theevproject.com/documents.php 
9 U.S. Department of Energy (July 2012) 
10 http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=447&t=3 
11 http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=100&t=3 
User Categories Percentage of users
Commercial 0.20%
Shift industrial 0.30%




Storage and all other data used in the examples are randomly generated based on 
information and data provided by U.S. Energy Information Administration12, U.S. 
Department of Energy13 and Electricity Storage Association14 as follows. 
Distributed storage in the market has maximum capacity of 100 (kWh) and assigned to 
10% of the users. Storage cost for any type of battery is assumed to be 0.01-0.03 
($/kWh)15. 20% of SDRs assumed to have generation capacity. Distributed generation 
such as solar panels, or small wind turbines for SDRs are assumed to have capacity of 
about 50-1000 (kWh) and their generation cost is uniformly distributed on 0.03-0.09 
($/kWh). BGFs generation capacity is uniformly distributed on 5-1000 (MW), and their 
generating cost is about 0.009-0.050 ($/kWh)16. Their storage capacity is assumed to 
be 1% of their generation capacity with the cost of 0.01-0.03 ($/kWh). Slope and 
intercept for the inverse supply function for BGFs in the system are set to 0.000001 
($/kWh2) and 0.05 ($/kWh) respectively.  
To compare the complexity of the problem, different scenarios on different networks 
with different number of BGFs and DSRs are defined and compared as shown in Table 
11. To evaluate the appropriateness of the proposed Stackelberg model and market 
structure, each scenario is solved with two different models of One-Way and Two-Way 
to show the difference between the two mechanisms defined in Chapter 3. Additionally, 




15 Electricity Storage Association (July 2012) 
16 U.S. Energy Information Administration (July 2012) 
 
 104 
two more models are compared with the One-Way and Two-Way Stackelberg models. 
One is demand satisfaction with no Demand Response program for SDRs. In this model 
demands are assigned to the first available time spot after the request time of the 
demands. So SDRs’ feasibility constraints are added to the ISO’s decision problem, 
while BGFs are still competing in the lower level. This model is called NO DR model. 
The other model assumes that there is neither a demand response program among 
SDRS, nor there is any game among BGFs. Hence their constraints are all added to 
ISO’s decision problem as a one level problem. This model is called NO DR-NO 
GAME. Comparing these two models with the Stackelberg game model would show 
benefits of the integrated demand response model and also the new market mechanism 
designed in this study. 
Moreover, to evaluate the proposed solution algorithm, different solution 
methodologies in solving the Stackelberg model are compared. As discussed in Chapter 
4, the proposed Stackelberg game can be converted to a MPEC model. Then the MPEC 
model can be solved through either nonlinear MPEC solvers in the market or through 
SOS, MIP or heuristic techniques. In next section, all these approaches are used and 
compared together and with the proposed algorithm in Chapter 4 which will be called 
Mona from this point. The corresponding MPECs, SOS, and MIPs are solved using 
GAMS 24.2.1 (NPATH, CPLEX, and Xpress solvers). All other algorithms, Mona, NO 
DR, and NO DR-NO GAME are coded and solved in Xpress optimization suite 7.1 on 
a computer with i7 CPU and 8.00 GB of RAM. All designed scenarios are shown in 
Table 11. Each set of network is used to generate different sets of scenarios with 
different number of users. Each scenario is then solved with 6 different algorithms: 
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Mona, SOS, MIP, MPEC, NO DR, NO DR-NO GAME with both One-Way and Two-
Way models. Detailed results for all scenarios are presented in Appendix A. Results 
and computational statistics for all scenarios will be discussed in next section. 
Table 11 Scenarios’ Settings 
Topology Node Line Model Scenario SDRs BGFs 
Small 13 12 One-Way 1 5 1 
2 50 2 
3 100 2 
Two-Way 1 5 1 
2 50 2 
3 100 2 
Medium 37 36 One-Way 4 10 1 
5 100 2 
6 1000 10 
7 5000 10 
Two-Way 4 10 1 
5 100 2 
6 1000 10 
7 5000 10 
Large 122 117 One- Way 8 100 2 
9 1000 5 
10 5000 10 
Two-Way 8 100 2 
9 1000 5 
10 5000 10 
Numerical Results 
Basic computational statistics for different scenarios defined in Table 11 are 
summarized in Table 12. As number of users and suppliers increases, number of 
variables and constraints increases dramatically and so does solution time.  
Results indicate that the MPEC solver is incapable of solving almost all problem 
instances other than Scenario 1 with only 5 users for local optimal (Table 13-Table 15). 
When user number increases to 1000 and more, SOS and MIP solvers also become 
unreliable and inefficient in most cases. However, Mona solves all scenarios to 
optimality or a good near optimal solution in a reasonable time, which makes it a 
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reliable algorithm for solving both One-Way and Two-Way models compared to other 
solution methodologies.  
Table 12 Computational Statistics and Objectives for Different Scenarios 











Small 13 12 
One-Way 
1 5 1 3,142 1,449 0.05 
2 50 2 20,903 12,326 0.31 
3 100 2 39,488 23,636 0.59 
Two-Way 
1 5 1 5,410 2,174 0.08 
2 50 2 50,526 21,495 0.39 
3 100 2 97,970 41,744 0.67 
Medium  37 36 
One-Way 
4 10 1 7,995 3,611 0.13 
5 100 2 43,457 25,309 0.80 
6 1000 10 405,629 247,015 15.52 
7 5000 10 9,928,633 2,168,684 231.16 
Two-Way 
4 10 1 22,367 5,456 0.25 
5 100 2 191,408 43,562 1.10 
6 1000 10 2,000,587 441,527 27.34 
7 5000 10 9,928,633 2,168,684 911.59 
Large 122 117 
One-Way 
8 100 2 49,383 26,114 0.94 
9 1000 5 410,297 247,197 10.31 
10 5000 10 1,978,042 1,208,129 267.32 
Two-Way 
8 100 2 503,799 44,410 1.26 
9 1000 5 5,381,282 442,287 19.28 
10 5000 10 26,734,009 2,170,724 982.62 
 
To have an effective demand response model, the dynamic model needs to be run every 
30 minutes. So it is important to have a solution algorithm which can find a solution in 
less than 30 minutes. Comparing solution times for both One-Way and Two-Way 
models, the algorithm Mona is performing better than any other solution algorithm in 




Figure 12 Solution time for different solution algorithms for One-Way Model 
 
Figure 13 Solution time for different solution algorithms for Two-Way Model 
To be able to evaluate the results and effect of the models on the market, it is important 
to investigate some market indicators. Market share, 𝑠𝑖, is an indicator of competition 
in a market and is a percentage of the market supplied by a specific entity. When market 
share is mostly assigned to a limited number of suppliers, it conveys that there is less 
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competition in the market. As the market moves toward perfect competition, market 
share distributes among all suppliers more evenly and so their standard deviations 
decrease. Hirschman-Herfindhal Index (HHI) (Ventosa, Baıllo et al., 2005) is an 
indicator for market share evaluation and is defined in equation (5. 2). 𝑠𝑖 is the market 
share of supplier 𝑖 among 𝑁 suppliers. 
𝐻𝐻𝐼 = ∑ 𝑠𝑖
2𝑁
𝑖=1 ,   
1
𝑁
 ≤ 𝐻𝐻𝐼 ≤ 1  
(5. 2) 
As 𝐻𝐻𝐼 increases, competition level in the market decreases. So small enough HHIs 
show that the market is not a monopoly. One of the goals in Smart Grid is to encourage 
participation of individuals in the market and motivate use of distributed energy sources 
in supplying demands. Here 𝐻𝐻𝐼 is used to show whether a market is a monopoly or a 
competitive market and it also indicates the level of supply diversification in the 
market.  Figure 15 illustrates HHI for different scenarios comparing the proposed 
Stackelberg model with NO DR and NO DR-No GAME. Lower HHI in the models 
with competition among suppliers (Mona and NO DR algorithms) compared to NO 
DR-NO GAME approach shows how implementing competition among suppliers can 
prevent the monopoly of supply in the market and motivate supply diversification. This 
is valid in both One-Way and Two Way models (Figure 14 and Figure 15). Results 
demonstrate the capability of the proposed Stackelberg model in distributing market 
power among players in the game which interprets perfect competition in the market. 
Distributed market share in a system not only prevents system from going toward 
monopoly, but also supports availability of supply in case of unpredicted disruptions. 
In this market, the system is not relying on a few sets of generating companies and so 
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it would be more reliable. Interestingly, results confirm that as the number of generators 
and users increases in the market, there is more supply diversification in the system. 
 
Figure 14 Comparison of HHI index for different algorithms in One-Way model 
 
Figure 15 Comparison of HHI index for different algorithms in Two-Way model 
Increase of supply diversification in the market not only leads to better market 
indicators, it also results in use of more renewable energies and thus a better objective 
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function value (Figure 16 and Figure 17). Results convey that having a competitive 
market without demand response is better than having none of the features, while 
implementing the integrated competitive demand response model is the best of all.    
 
Figure 16 Comparison of ISO Obj. for different algorithms in One-Way model 
Mohsenian-Rad and Wong (2010) used an index called PAR (5. 3), which is Peak to 










Figure 17 Comparison of ISO Obj. for different algorithms in Two-Way model 
They minimized PAR in their objective function and claimed that as PAR decreases, 
consumption would get leveled and this would be beneficial to the system. However, 
this may not always be true, specifically when dynamic pricing is applied and idle 
capacities are available in the system. PAR might be a good indicator when limited 
constant capacities are available, but with integration of renewable energy and 
distributed generation capacities in the network, it is better to minimize cost instead of 
PAR while trying to keep load levels in acceptable range through applying real time 
prices based on total consumption in the market. This approach not only reduces costs, 
but also incentivizes users to consume during time periods with lower prices and more 
available capacities which may lead to lower PAR depending on parameters in the 
pricing function. In this study the objective function is to motivate use of local 
generators, while market price is directly dependent on total consumption in the market 
which encourages demands being shifted to more cost efficient time windows while 
using available capacities efficiently. Although Figure 18 and Figure 19 demonstrate 
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better PAR index for algorithm Mona in most scenarios, it is not always guaranteed 
and it is dependent on generated data sets. Limited feasible time intervals for satisfying 
demands, lower inverse supply function’s parameters in some time windows, and 
availability of low cost distributed supplies in the network in specific time periods 
could be reasons for shifting demand toward specific time instances in different data 
sets which result in always better objective function but not necessarily a lower PAR 
indicator.  However, as is shown in Figure 20, it is clear that the algorithm shifted 
demands from some peak windows to to off peak times of day. 
 
Figure 18 Comparison of PAR index for different algorithms in One-Way model 
Among different solution methodologies applied to the Stackelberg model, as is shown 
in Figure 12, Figure 13, Figure 21, and Figure 22, Mona has better solution time 
compared to other methods for all scenarios. This is while it has a good objective value 





Figure 19 Comparison of PAR index for different algorithms in Two-Way model 
 




Figure 21 ISO objective for different solution methodologies in Two-Way Model 
 
Figure 22 ISO objective for different solution methodologies in Two-Way Model 
Moreover, Mona performs well in encouraging participants in the network. Average 
SDRs and BGFs’ objective functions in Mona are considerably better than any of the 
other models (NO DR and NO DR-NO GAME) (Figure 23-Figure 26). It is obvious 
that having competition in the market is very important for BGFs to increase revenue. 
Also applying demand response model in a competetive market makes it more 
appealing for households and users to participate in the system. Comparing 
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participants’ avgerage objective in Mona with MIP and SOS is not a valid comparison 
due to the way the algorithm works. In the proposed algorithm by adding cuts in the 
second and third stages based on the best possible solution of the ISO, the algorithm 
maximizes all individual objectives. This results in finding the best set of equilibrium 
solutions for the lower level problem. However, in the MIP and SOS algorithms, the 
objective is only focused on optimizing the objective function and so comparison of 
the equilibrium sets is not a fair comparison. It is also necessary to mention that without 
having access to real data it is very difficult to estimate the users’utility function. 
Underestimation of the utilities is a reason for big differences in SDRs’ average 
objective functions from different methods as are shown in Figure 23 and Figure 24.  
 




Figure 24 SDRs average objective in Two-Way model 
 




Figure 26 BGFs average objective in Two-Way model 
So Mona generally perfoms better from both aspects of solution methodology 
(compared to MPEC, MIP, and SOS) and modeling (comapred to NO Dr and NO DR-
NO GAME). 
An interesting result came from comparison of One-Way and Two-Way models. As it 
is clear in Figure 27 and Figure 28, the market share index is almost the same in both 
models. This conveys that although having a competition would improve the system, 
strict controling of one variable by an operator does not affect the competition level. 
That means, if the system is left to reach its equilibrium itself or let an operator to 
control one of the system variables individually does not make any differnce in market 
indices. However, if all users have the right of decision making over all variables, their 
objective values will be better. That is a system with perfect competition is more 




Figure 27 HHI index for One-Way and Two-Way models for all scenarios 
 




Figure 29 SDRs and BGFs average objective difference ((Two-Way Obj.) - (One-Way Obj.)) 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Exogenous input in this problem is generated randomly based on real data. However, 
it is of interest to study how their values may affect solution results. To study these 
changes and also make appropriate policy recommendations, sensitivity analysis is 
conducted over several scenarios. In this section, results from one of the scenarios are 
discussed (scenario 9). In the sensitivity analysis several cases are compared to the base 
case. In each case a multiplier is applied to the studied base input. That is numbers on 
the horizontal axis on the sensitivity graphs are percentage multipliers of the base case 
in the sensitivity analysis. 
Higher storage capacities in the system would make the decision problem more 
flexible. As is shown in Figure 30, increase of storage capacity gives the option to users 
to buy and store more electricity in the time of low prices and use during peak times. 
This results in lower objective function. On the other hand, having more storage 
capacity, users are more willing to buy from one specific provider with lower cost and 
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store in advance instead of buying from a higher cost local generator. This would result 
in higher HHI and so less supply diversification in the market. However, this would 
encourage local users to install lower cost and more efficient storage and generation 
systems. The intercept between HHI and objective function would be a good estimate 
of average storage capacity to have in the system in order to have both good objective 
function and competitive market. This is the same for distributed generation capacities 
(Figure 31). Having larger local generation capacities, objective function gets better. 
However, the provider with lower cost would be able to supply more electricity in the 
system which results in higher supply diversification in the market. However, this again 
could be a good motive for local generators to reduce their initial costs and use more 
efficient generators. So motivating use of bigger generators and storage devices in 
households and local generators would result in a better objective function and 
eventually more efficient system.  
 




Figure 31 Sensitivity over SDRs' generation capacity-Scenario 9- Two-Way model 
However, larger storage capacities and genertors for local use are not efficient and 
economical yet. Improvements in the area of storage and generation technologies need 
to advance more. Consequently, responsible entities may want to invest in these area 
of research for development of more efficient and reliable storage and generation 
capacities. 
 
Figure 32 Sensitivity over Thermal Limit-Scenario 9- Two-Way Model 
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Network limitation always makes problems more complex. Sensitivity analysis on 
thermal limits of lines demontrated that increase of thermal limit would result in better 
objective function and HHI. However, after a certain capacity, increaing the limit 
would not be beneficial. Though decreasing limits more than 40% of current limits 
would cause problem infeasibilty. So another good area of investment would be to 
increase the lines capacities in some parts of the network. 
One of the ideas in demand response programs benefit from flexibility of users in their 
demands. The best case is when all demands are completely flexible (Relaxed), and can 
be met at any time of the day, and the worse case is when demands are very restricted 
(Restricted) and have to be satistied at the time of request. These two scenarios are 
compared with the base case in which demands are just flexible and have to be satisfied 
during a certain time window.  Figure 33 illustrate results from these three cases. As it 
is expected, objective function, PAR and HHI are all better when demands are relaxed 
and have no time restrictions. However, when it comes to restricted case, the problem 
is not feasible anymore. That means with increase of public knowledge and 
encouraging people toward relaxing their time of use for some of their demands, both 
users and suppliers would benefit. So investment in increasing public knowledge could 









Chapter 6:  Conclusions and Future Work 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
Researchers showed that one of the best areas for energy efficiency opportunity is in 
installing energy management controls that shift time of electricity use (Schweitzer and 
Tonn, 2005). In this study Smart Grid in its real size is divided into three main tiers of 
zonal, regional and cross regional market. Then an appropriate market mechanism and 
an integrated dynamic Demand Response program and market equilibrium applicable 
to zonal level is proposed. The model promotes a certain level of disaggregation in such 
large systems. The problem is modeled as a one-leader multi-follower Stackelberg 
game. This research has contributed to the state of art not only in energy market and 
demand management modeling individually, but also extended the state of the art by 
combining these two areas of knowledge to develop an appropriate system applicable 
to the future of energy systems, Smart Grid. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this 
is the first attempt in combining Demand Response scheduling and market equilibrium 
modeling. The algorithm proposed in this research could be implemented in the future 
Smart Grid meters to help users communicate with the system and enables the system 
to accommodate different sources of energy.       
The proposed market mechanism has several important characteristics. It has good 
incentives for both public and private sectors to engage in the system. The proposed 
model would give users knowledge of their usage portfolio. That is instead of old 
fashioned lump sum electricity bill, they can understand how much they are paying for 
each appliance and when and what is the highest and lowest rates during day. This 
would give them a better sense of their usage behavior. Results showed higher 
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individual welfare through applying the proposed integrated model, which is a good 
incentive for consumers to participate in the proposed mechanism and also motivate 
them to install renewable energy sources. Also the proposed model maximizes big 
suppliers’ revenue as decision makers of the system which is a good incentive for them 
to participate in the system. Also unbundling generation, transmission, and distribution 
providers eliminates power monopoly in the market and maximizes individual benefits. 
Moreover, in the current systems big consumers pay less than small consumers while 
the proposed model is treating everyone the same which is another appealing feature 
for small users. Also the mechanism eliminates price cap in the system and considers 
real time nodal prices based on reverse supply function. Although this captures the 
elasticity of the market price but it may hurt the lower income families. In order to 
protect these groups, this mechanism is capable of considering different solutions such 
as offering subset of concessions to lower income families and household. Although 
the proposed mechanism is covering many different aspects since this research is 
mostly focused on the operation side of demand response program in the future system, 
the market design is not detailed in every aspects. 
In the demand response modeling of the Smart Grid the hierarchal decision making 
problem among ISO, BGFs, and SDRs is modeled as a bi-level model. Two different 
types of hierarchy for the ISO are studied. One with complete power over trade values, 
and the other is a shared right of decision making with other users. Presuming that ISO 
has the hierarchy in decision making over the trade amounts in the network, while 
proving feasibility of the lower level equilibrium problem, an algorithm is then 
developed for solving the dynamic problem. The model is then transformed to a MPEC 
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and then to a mixed integer problem. Commercial solvers and software is used to 
evaluate the proposed algorithm and mathematical models. The proposed integrated 
demand response and market equilibrium model in this study is applied to several 
different scenarios on several electricity networks with different characteristics.  
Although the model can be transformed to MPEC model, MPEC algorithms are based 
on nonlinear techniques and so are not capable of solving large scale problems. The 
SOS algorithm is very time consuming and is not applicable in real size problems. 
Eventually, the MIP algorithm, is both time consuming and not reliable in large scale 
problems. However, in some cases it provides better solutions. There is a major issue 
with the MIP approach. That is the instability of the model. MIP’s solution is very much 
dependant on the value of BigMs in the problem. With a little change in the value of 
BigM, the problem suddenly falls into infeasibility. As discussed in the MIP model 
section, determining BigM in solving the MIP is very crucial. Since the MIP model is 
unstable due to its sensitivity to BigMs’ value, even if it provides a good solution in a 
reasonable time, the solution is not very reliable. 
One of the specifications of the proposed algorithm, Mona, is its search direction. In 
the proposed algorithm the problem is being solved from top to bottom while 
optimization algorithms are mostly bottom to top. Bottom to top search means 
searching among feasible solutions, while in this algorithm search starts from the big 
picture which is the best bound. 
Comparison of numerical solutions from the integrated demand response model applied 
through Mona or any of the solution methods (SOS, MIP, or MPEC) with the NO DR 
and NO DR-NO GAME models, shows better market indicators for the proposed 
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mechanisms. This means better use of distributed energy sources in the system while 
implementing DR programs combined with competition in the market. Better HHI 
indicates that the proposed model would prevent monopoly in the system and also 
results in higher supply diversification. Moreover, the proposed model would distribute 
demand peaks to the best time of day with more available resources and less prices. 
Better individual welfare and higher revenues are good incentives for public and private 
sectors for acceptance of the proposed system among themselves. The model also 
facilitates use of storage capacities through managing their charging schedule during 
low price time periods which also results in more leveled demands during the day. 
Depending on the data sets, an average of 23% of demands are shifted during the day 
from peak times to off peak times applying the proposed model. This is a little better 
than 20% shifted demands through applying only time-of-use tariffs (Sovacool, 2009).  
Based on sensitivity analysis it is recommended that responsible entities invest in 
development of storage and renewable generation with higher capacities in order to 
have more efficient system. Also investment on network capacity improvement and 
increase of public knowledge would result in a better market share indicator and so 
better individual welfare for public and revenue for suppliers. 
Finally, the author believes unbundling generation, transmission, and distribution 
providers is a necessity in order to make a market performs better in both aspects of 
system efficiency and incentivizing users. Moreover, expanding information 
availability to participants and trusting the system to converge to an equilibrium itself 
rather than forcing controls over some decisions would increase public participation 
which results in a better system performance. 
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Future Research Paths 
This study opens a new path of research in the area of energy system modeling and 
management. Several studies can be done after this research which are introduced in 
this section as follows.  
 System resiliency is an issue in electrical distribution and transmission networks. 
Modifying the proposed model to be resilient in case of unforeseen events is the next 
step of this study. 
 It would be of interest to study the stochastic feature of demand and generation capacity 
in future. Though, due to dynamic nature of the studied problem it is not necessary to 
consider it in the model to have meaningful results.  
 Implementing a good and accurate pricing function directly affects the output of the 
proposed system. Applying and evaluating different dynamic pricing functions in the 
proposed system such as shadow prices are among interesting future works.  
 In the proposed system, SDRs influence market price indirectly through total market 
demand and supply. It would be interesting to study their direct effect on market 
pricing and compare the results with the current model. 
 It is of interest to study different objective functions and attitudes for the ISO and 
compare the results in future.  
 Using an accurate utility function would definitely result in better and more 
encouraging output. Implementing Smart Grid system, there will be a huge amount of 
data collected and available for investigation. One piece of information to gain from 
these data is estimating users’ utility function. This can be captured from historical 
demand data to better understand users’ demand behavior.  
 This model is based on shifting and scheduling demands. However, considering 
demand reduction and semi satisfied demands in future would also be interesting. 
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 Although the examples are generated based on open sourced real data, it is always of 





















































































































































Mona 0.05 0.00 0.00 6.18 72.62 0.530 0.2700 0.00 - 70.86 30.18 Optimal - 
SOS 0.54 0.00 0.00 6.18 82.70 0.530 0.2700 0.00 - -336.00 29.00 Optimal - 
MIP 0.15 0.15 0.00 6.18 79.13 1.000 0.4100 0.06 - 72.00 33.00 Optimal - 
MPEC 5.13 0.11 0.00 7.62 85.02 0.370 0.2000 0.03 - -335.00 30.00 Local Optimal - 
NO DR 0.06 1.66 0.00 10.44 89.21 0.910 0.3900 0.00 - 62.00 35.00 Optimal - 








Mona 0.31 0.01 0.01 2.68 25.01 0.160 0.0500 0.00 0.00 111.10 64.57 Optimal 0% 
SOS 0.65 0.01 0.01 2.67 19.75 0.130 0.0500 0.00 0.00 -308.00 66.00 Optimal 0% 
MIP 5.76 0.45 0.00 2.02 21.27 0.180 0.0600 0.01 0.01 139.00 73.00 Optimal - 
MPEC 2036.98 - - - - - - - - - - Infeasible - 
NO DR 0.23 18.13 0.00 3.24 39.04 0.380 0.0800 0.00 0.00 97.00 67.00 Optimal - 









Mona 0.59 0.06 0.06 2.03 17.84 0.110 0.0300 0.00 0.00 102.61 69.69 Optimal 0% 
SOS 1.36 0.00 0.00 2.24 18.19 0.080 0.0300 0.00 0.00 -315.00 69.00 Optimal - 
MIP 7.16 0.68 0.00 2.56 14.84 0.090 0.0300 0.03 0.04 129.00 76.00 Optimal - 
MPEC 3665.71 - - - - - - - - - - Infeasible - 
NO DR 0.40 34.44 0.00 3.68 31.15 0.330 0.0600 0.00 0.00 88.00 67.00 Optimal - 


















Mona 0.08 0.00 0.00 6.18 89.21 0.530 0.2700 0.00 - 71.00 30.00 Optimal - 
SOS 0.36 0.00 0.00 6.35 99.30 0.530 0.2700 0.00 - -351.00 39.00 Optimal - 
MIP 0.10 0.00 0.00 6.51 50.93 0.530 0.2700 0.00 - -359.00 47.00 Optimal - 
MPEC 3.08 - - - - - - - - - - Infeasible - 
NO DR 0.56 1.74 0.00 14.08 89.21 1.000 0.4100 0.00 - 50.00 43.00 Optimal - 








Mona 0.39 0.01 0.01 2.24 21.30 0.160 0.0500 0.00 0.00 135.00 72.00 Optimal 0% 
SOS 2.96 0.01 0.01 2.59 18.02 0.200 0.0600 0.00 0.00 -304.00 68.00 Optimal 0% 
MIP 1.72 0.01 0.00 2.41 26.20 0.350 0.0800 0.00 0.00 -309.00 64.00 Optimal - 
MPEC 95.02 - - - - - - - - - - Infeasible - 
NO DR 0.27 25.90 0.00 5.10 43.83 0.640 0.1100 0.00 0.00 99.00 67.00 Optimal - 









Mona 0.67 0.06 0.06 2.37 12.56 0.100 0.0300 0.00 0.00 128.00 75.00 Optimal 0% 
SOS 3600.43 - - - - - - - - - - No Solution - 
MIP 0.84 0.06 0.00 1.69 15.62 0.170 0.0400 0.00 0.00 -317.00 67.00 Optimal - 
MPEC 244.97 - - - - - - - - - - Infeasible - 
NO DR 0.43 41.13 0.00 4.00 31.09 0.550 0.0700 0.00 0.00 82.00 62.00 Optimal - 
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Mona 0.13 0.13 0.13 8.11 33.61 0.410 0.1800 0.00 - 115.09 61.79 Optimal 0% 
SOS 0.21 0.13 0.13 7.28 35.34 0.610 0.2300 0.00 - -1078.00 67.00 Optimal 0% 
MIP 0.30 0.37 0.00 9.92 37.16 0.530 0.2100 0.03 - 130.00 56.00 Optimal - 
MPEC 300.96 - - - - - - - - - - Infeasible - 
NO DR 0.13 26.40 0.00 5.44 38.09 0.880 0.2800 0.12 - 67.00 42.00 Optimal - 









Mona 0.80 0.63 0.63 2.53 20.61 0.050 0.0200 0.11 0.16 107.13 66.45 Optimal 0% 
SOS 60.50 0.66 0.63 2.15 19.47 0.060 0.0200 0.11 0.16 -1058.00 62.00 Integer Solution 5% 
MIP 20.94 2.25 0.00 2.39 17.15 0.070 0.0200 0.18 0.25 138.00 73.00 Optimal - 
MPEC 3642.14 - - - - - - - - - - Infeasible - 
NO DR 0.50 35.74 0.00 2.55 35.67 0.300 0.0500 1.53 2.16 97.00 64.00 Optimal - 











Mona 15.52 322.71 322.71 1.87 1.58 0.030 0.0100 0.39 1.25 4518.75 71397.36 Optimal 0% 
SOS 50.55 322.70 322.70 1.89 1.48 0.020 0.0000 5.37 11.56 3359.00 71324.00 Optimal 0% 
MIP 7389.47 2441.59 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.0000 0.00 0.00 4568.00 71770.00 Unfinished - 
MPEC 3857.73 - - - - - - - - - - Infeasible - 
NO DR 4.86 5954.96 0.00 1.88 2.43 0.290 0.0200 91.67 174.07 4515.00 71232.00 Optimal - 











Mona 231.16 4.91 4.91 1.98 1.37 0.010 0.0000 0.00 0.00 4595.73 76372.76 Optimal 0% 
SOS 952.06 4.82 4.82 1.98 1.09 0.004 0.0000 0.00 0.00 3438.00 76355.00 Optimal 0% 
MIP 682.05 4.92 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.0000 0.00 0.00 4633.00 76313.00 Unfinished - 
MPEC 35044.54 - - - - - - - - - - Infeasible - 
NO DR 23.04 19722.69 0.00 1.93 1.74 0.320 0.0100 -41.91 164.14 4592.00 76281.00 Optimal - 
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Mona 0.25 0.13 0.13 8.11 35.11 0.410 0.1800 0.00 - 118.00 59.00 Optimal 0% 
SOS 0.48 0.13 0.13 7.28 38.22 0.610 0.2300 0.00 - -1078.00 67.00 Optimal 0% 
MIP 0.45 0.13 0.00 8.33 37.67 0.510 0.2000 0.00 - -1080.00 67.00 Optimal - 
MPEC 1588.43 - - - - - - - - - - Infeasible - 
NO DR 0.20 30.53 0.00 5.44 38.09 0.890 0.2800 0.12 - 66.00 42.00 Optimal - 









Mona 1.10 0.81 0.63 2.68 16.47 0.050 0.0200 0.27 0.39 125.00 67.00 Optimal 30% 
SOS 135.22 0.69 0.63 2.60 16.77 0.050 0.0200 0.11 0.16 -1061.00 64.00 Integer Solution 11% 
MIP 15.21 0.66 0.00 2.09 20.09 0.070 0.0200 0.00 0.00 -1057.00 61.00 Optimal - 
MPEC 243.85 - - - - - - - - - - Infeasible - 
NO DR 0.51 33.89 0.00 2.55 35.01 0.180 0.0400 1.15 1.63 96.00 65.00 Optimal - 











Mona 27.34 323.24 322.71 2.00 1.73 0.030 0.0100 0.61 1.93 4570.00 71726.00 Optimal 0% 
SOS 3605.72 - - - - - - - - - - No Solution - 
MIP 406.20 322.84 0.00 1.90 2.04 0.030 0.0100 0.00 0.00 3351.00 71114.00 Optimal - 
MPEC 4177.31 - - - - - - - - - - Infeasible - 
NO DR 5.22 5960.98 0.00 2.11 2.49 0.330 0.0200 62.34 116.34 4528.00 71605.00 Optimal - 











Mona 911.59 4.91 4.91 1.94 0.93 0.003 0.0000 0.00 0.00 4637.00 76316.00 Optimal 0% 
SOS 4052.34 - - - - - - - - - - No Solution - 
MIP 2760.95 4.91 0.00 1.94 1.23 0.003 0.0000 0.00 0.00 3434.00 76314.00 Optimal - 
MPEC - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
NO DR 66.52 21924.74 0.00 1.94 1.92 0.240 0.0100 -388.12 1282.74 4590.00 76285.00 Optimal - 
NO DR-NO GAME 236.44 25939.55 0.00 2.07 2.00 0.160 0.0100 -1558.27 1429.85 4593.00 76289.00 Optimal - 
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Mona 0.94 2.09 2.09 4.49 16.03 0.140 0.0400 0.00 0.00 93.72 62.60 Optimal 0% 
SOS 5.42 2.31 2.09 4.20 17.07 0.150 0.0400 0.00 0.00 -3720.00 60.00 Integer Solution 11% 
MIP 585.75 4.67 0.00 4.55 15.13 0.150 0.0400 0.00 0.00 121.00 67.00 Optimal - 
MPEC 3794.09 - - - - - - - - - - Infeasible - 
NO DR 0.55 39.68 0.00 3.47 32.18 0.280 0.0500 1.03 1.09 85.00 61.00 Optimal - 










Mona 10.31 1028.52 1028.52 1.92 2.47 0.040 0.0100 0.00 0.00 4672.74 75566.20 Optimal 0% 
SOS 1741.35 1069.99 1028.04 1.92 2.44 0.030 0.0100 0.00 0.00 861.00 75565.00 Integer Solution 4% 
MIP 13689.96 - - - - - - - - - - Unfinished - 
MPEC 4251.55 - - - - - - - - - - Infeasible - 
NO DR 4.51 5448.28 0.00 2.06 3.89 0.040 0.0100 0.00 0.00 4666.00 75488.00 Optimal - 












Mona 267.32 524.61 524.61 1.94 1.06 0.010 0.0000 0.00 0.00 4562.70 73595.50 Optimal 0% 
SOS 3624.47 - - - - - - - - - - No Solution - 
MIP 10910.98 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.0000 0.00 0.00 5.00 8.00 Unfinished - 
MPEC 48968.62 - - - - - - - - - - Infeasible - 
NO DR 77.86 23560.86 0.00 1.93 1.12 0.240 0.0100 -87.15 445.26 4558.00 73412.00 Optimal - 
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Mona 1.26 2.09 2.09 4.44 17.00 0.170 0.0400 0.00 0.00 99.00 61.00 Optimal 0% 
SOS 11.13 2.09 2.09 4.37 18.50 0.140 0.0400 0.00 0.00 -3723.00 61.00 Optimal 0% 
MIP 193.46 2.09 0.00 4.38 20.22 0.150 0.0400 0.00 0.00 -3721.00 62.00 Optimal - 
MPEC 6063.09 - - - - - - - - - - Infeasible - 
NO DR 0.58 42.25 0.00 3.47 32.18 0.210 0.0400 1.03 1.09 85.00 61.00 Optimal - 










Mona 19.28 1028.52 1028.52 1.92 2.53 0.040 0.0100 0.00 0.00 4702.00 75500.00 Optimal 0% 
SOS 3611.16 - - - - - - - - - - No Solution - 
MIP 749.58 1028.52 0.00 1.92 2.46 0.040 0.0100 0.00 0.00 862.00 75569.00 Optimal - 
MPEC - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
NO DR 5.37 4732.54 0.00 2.06 3.42 0.040 0.0100 69.55 115.64 4668.00 75495.00 Optimal - 












Mona 982.62 524.61 524.61 1.96 0.89 0.010 0.0000 0.00 0.00 4600.00 73552.00 Optimal 0% 
SOS 12846.89 - - - - - - - - - - No Solution - 
MIP 3870.23 - - - - - - - - - - No Solution - 
MPEC 65213.77 - - - - - - - - - - N/A - 
NO DR 96.63 25337.72 0.00 1.94 1.01 0.340 0.0100 -57.19 209.66 4558.00 73408.00 Optimal - 
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